THE EFFECT OF INCREASED AUDIT DISCLOSURE ON INVESTORS\u27 PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT, AUDITORS, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION by Doxey, Marcus M.
University of Kentucky
UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Accountancy Accountancy
2013
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED AUDIT
DISCLOSURE ON INVESTORS'
PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT,
AUDITORS, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING:
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION
Marcus M. Doxey
University of Kentucky, marcus.doxey@uky.edu
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Accountancy at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses
and Dissertations--Accountancy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Doxey, Marcus M., "THE EFFECT OF INCREASED AUDIT DISCLOSURE ON INVESTORS' PERCEPTIONS OF
MANAGEMENT, AUDITORS, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION" (2013). Theses and
Dissertations--Accountancy. 2.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/accountancy_etds/2
STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution has been
given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining any needed copyright
permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written permission statements(s) from the
owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing electronic
distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine).
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make
accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the
document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide access unless a
preapproved embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in future
works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to register the
copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on behalf of
the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of the program; we
verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation including all changes required
by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements above.
Marcus M. Doxey, Student
Dr. Robert Ramsay, Major Professor
Dr. Dan Stone, Director of Graduate Studies
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED AUDIT DISCLOSURE ON INVESTORS' 
PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT, AUDITORS, AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
 
 
 
___________________________________ 
 
DISSERTATION 
___________________________________ 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
College of Business and Economics 
at the University of Kentucky  
 
 
By 
Marcus Mason Doxey 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
Director: Dr. Robert Ramsay, Professor of Accounting 
 
Lexington, Kentucky 
 
2013 
 
Copyright © Marcus Mason Doxey 2013 
 
 
ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED AUDIT DISCLOSURE ON INVESTORS' 
PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT, AUDITORS, AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
 
 
Standard setters recently proposed increasing audit disclosures and 
reporting. Two experiments examine the effects of auditor-provided disclosures 
on financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor independence, management 
credibility, reporting quality, materiality, and investment decisions. In the first 
experiment, I manipulate auditor agreement with management’s estimates and 
whether the estimates are incentive-consistent for management. I find that users 
view auditors as more (less) independent when they agree (disagree) with 
management, given an unqualified opinion. I also find that users are able to 
identify management bias using audit disclosures, and that the disclosures are 
value-relevant. In the second experiment, I provide users with either an explicit or 
implicit materiality disclosure and elicit users’ materiality judgments either before 
or after the disclosure. I find that users’ materiality judgments are closer to the 
auditor’s when elicited after an explicit materiality disclosure. Path analysis 
demonstrates that users’ materiality judgments affect subsequent investment and 
audit-related judgments but do not affect important decisions related to auditor 
liability and investment. The findings provide empirical support for the argument 
that additional audit disclosures would increase the transparency and value-
relevance of the audit report. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction and Motivation 
Audit standard setters around the world recently issued proposals to 
clarify and expand auditor reporting and disclosure (PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2011, 
2012; APB 2012, 2013; EC 2012). The Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) in the United States, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) of the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the UK and Ireland, the European 
Commission (EC) in the EU, and the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) internationally all have active projects investigating 
ways to improve the auditor’s report. The standard setters’ actions are in 
response to calls from financial statement users (hereafter referred to simply as 
users) for various reforms to the audit report to make it more informative and 
valuable for those seeking information about a company’s financial statements. 
In attempting to meet user demands, standard setters could dramatically 
increase the amount of information required in audit reports and change the role 
and responsibilities of the auditor. In current practice, audit reports are typically 
around four paragraphs of standardized language, depending on the country in 
which they are produced. They communicate very little beyond the auditor’s 
opinion on the financial statements as a whole, and for some audits, an opinion 
on internal controls. Expanded audit reports could allow the auditor to address 
other matters considered significant by users that cannot be addressed in today’s 
standard reports, including management’s relative conservatism or 
aggressiveness in estimates, where estimates fall within an acceptable range, 
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items communicated to the audit committee, and the size limits the auditor used 
in determining items significant to the audit (PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2011; APB 
2012, 2013; EC 2012). The proposals have spurred vigorous debate amongst 
stakeholders (managers, auditors, investors, and board members) regarding the 
various options for change, particularly options that include auditor commentary 
on management’s financial reporting choices. The additional audit disclosures 
under consideration would significantly increase both the amount and scope of 
information presented to financial statement users, and there is little evidence 
available to evaluate what effect these changes will have on the various 
stakeholders involved. 
Investigating the effects of increased audit disclosure has important policy 
and economic implications. The four standard setters share general goals for the 
changes to the auditor’s report. For example, the PCAOB’s stated intent for 
changes to the audit reporting model is to increase transparency and relevance 
to users (2011b). Similarly, the IAASB’s stated goal is to enhance the value and 
relevance of auditor reporting (2011). However, little data are available to provide 
evidence concerning whether the standard setters’ proposals would achieve 
these goals 
Auditors and preparers have raised a number of fears related to the 
PCAOB’s concept release. The issues raised include concern that such 
disclosures would change the role of the auditor from providing assurance to 
being the primary source of information traditionally provided by management, 
the potential for confusion among investors due to conflicting information, 
           2
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increased legal liability, and further compression of year-end audit work that 
would put additional pressure on auditors’ time and resources. 
While auditors and management raise valid concerns, they may not yet 
recognize the potential benefits of expanding audit disclosure. One of the 
PCAOB’s stated goals for increasing audit disclosure is to make the auditing 
process more transparent to users (PCAOB 2011b). Prior literature suggests that 
educating users about the role and scope of an audit may help reduce high 
litigation costs (Jennings et al. 1991; Porter 1993). Auditors and managers may 
also underestimate the opportunity afforded by expanded audit disclosure to 
demonstrate their positive attributes to users. 
On the other hand, users are also raising concerns and making requests 
of regulators. One simple, but potentially important, user request has flown under 
the radar during much of the debate; users have repeatedly called for auditors to 
disclose quantitative materiality thresholds1 in the audit report (Mock et al. 2009; 
PCAOB 2011b, 2011d; IAASB 2011; Carcello et al. 2011; IAASB 2012). In light 
of the fact that users are requesting a materiality disclosure, users and regulators 
may feel that such a disclosure would increase the usefulness of the audit report, 
but as with many policy implementations, there may be both beneficial and 
detrimental unintended consequences. For example, a simple materiality 
disclosure could change the operational definition of materiality. Normatively, an 
auditor’s materiality judgment is based on what matters to users. If users change 
                                                            
1 The quantitative materiality threshold is the dollar amount that auditors use in considering 
whether an item is significant to their opinion on the financial statements as a whole. 
           3
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their materiality judgments based on the auditor’s disclosure, the relationship 
reverses with users’ materiality being determined by the auditor for the first time. 
Expanded audit disclosures are expected to have economically important 
effects as well. Numerous studies show that disclosures and transparency in 
accounting choices can improve users’ judgments of managers’ credibility (Clor-
Proell 2009; Hirst et al. 2007; Hodge et al. 2006), and increased disclosure 
surrounding the audit process may similarly impact credibility judgments. 
Furthermore, perceptions of audit quality and management credibility have been 
shown to affect investment decisions (Mayhew 2001; Barton and Mercer 2005; 
Hirst et al. 2007; Dee et al. 2011). Also, there is some evidence to suggest that 
materiality disclosures can improve a market’s ability to price securities (Fisher 
1990). Identifying the potential benefits of audit disclosures for auditors and 
management may help prevent them from using boilerplate language, which has 
been raised as a concern by users and regulators. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the effects of increased 
audit disclosure on users’ perceptions of financial reporting quality, management, 
and the auditor as well as users’ investment-related judgments and decisions. 
Two experiments accomplish this purpose. The first experiment is based on the 
attribution theory of causal inference (Kelley 1973) and support theory (Tversky 
and Koehler 1994) and tests the effect of audit disclosure content on users’ 
perceptions of auditor independence, management credibility, and users’ 
perceptions of the risk of material misstatement. The findings identify cases in 
which expanded disclosure causes users to perceive the management more 
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negatively, as well as cases in which users view management and the auditor in 
a more positive light than they would without the additional disclosure. 
The second experiment explores the effects of an auditor’s materiality 
disclosure on users’ materiality judgments. Based on the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic, I expect, and find, that users anchor their materiality 
judgments on the thresholds disclosed by the auditors, which subsequently affect 
additional investment-related judgments but not investment decisions. Because 
users’ materiality judgments have traditionally been made independent of input 
from the auditor, these findings indicate that materiality disclosures could 
fundamentally change the operational definition of materiality such that 
materiality would no longer be defined by what is important to users, but rather 
by what is important to auditors. 
 
Current Proposals and Debate 
During the period from 2011 to 2013, four of the world’s major audit 
standard setters issued proposals to clarify and expand auditor reporting and 
disclosure (PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2011, 2012; APB 2012, 2013; EC 2012). In 
June of 2011 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) issued 
its Concept Release on Possible Revisions to PCAOB Standards Related to 
Reports on Audited Financial Statements (2011b). The concept release solicits 
comments on four potential changes to audit reporting, including the addition of 
an “Auditor’s Discussion and Analysis” (AD&A) section to the audit report. The 
AD&A would, among other things, allow the auditor to discuss significant matters 
including the results of audit procedures, the auditor’s views regarding difficult or 
           5
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contentious issues encountered, management’s choice of accounting policies 
and estimates, materiality levels, and items communicated to the audit committee 
(PCAOB 2011b). 
In May of 2011 the International Auditing & Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) issued its consultation paper, Enhancing the Value of Auditor Reporting: 
Exploring Options for Change (2011). The consultation paper puts forth a number 
of options for expanding auditor reporting and disclosure, including a possible 
requirement for auditors to provide their insights about the reporting entity and 
the quality of the financial reports. The auditor’s views regarding “qualitative 
aspects of the entity’s accounting policies, including the relative conservatism or 
aggressiveness reflected in management’s selected policies” and an 
“assessment of management’s critical accounting judgments and estimates, 
including where each critical judgment or estimate falls within a range of possible 
results” (IAASB 2011, page 19) are both among the possibilities considered by 
the IAASB for expanding auditor reporting. The IAASB’s May 2011 release was 
followed by an invitation to comment on an example report in 2012 (IAASB 
2012). That example report included (among other things) paragraphs directly 
addressing management’s critical estimates. It should be noted that neither the 
IAASB nor the PCAOB proposals have resulted in specific, suggested changes 
to auditing standards. Rather, they are still being developed and discussed by 
stakeholders. 
The British Auditing Practices Board (APB) of the Financial Reporting 
Council (FRC) issued a number of consultation papers during 2012 and 2013 
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aimed at strengthening audit reporting and communication both with users and 
corporate boards (APB 2012, 2013). The APB’s proposals are more directed 
than those of the PCAOB and IAASB in that the APB is proposing semi-
standardized language that directly addresses numerous issues through specific 
changes to the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) followed by British and 
Irish firms. For instance, under the APB’s 2013 proposal, the auditor would have 
to discuss material risks, the application of materiality during the planning and 
performance of the audit (including “the threshold used by the auditor as being 
material for the financial statements as a whole”), and how the audit scope 
responded to identified material risks and the auditor’s application of materiality. 
These changes would specifically be enacted through a change to ISA 700 (APB 
2013). As with the PCAOB and IAASB proposals, investors appear to be reacting 
favorably to the proposal, while other parties are providing mixed reactions (APB 
2013). 
Finally, the European Commission suggested draft legislation for the 
European Parliament during 2012 (EC 2012). The suggested legislation contains 
similar types of disclosures as proposed by the other three standard setters, 
including materiality level and audit methodology disclosures. However, more 
detailed information about specific audit findings is reserved for the audit 
committee, and the proposed legislation is more sweeping than the proposals of 
the other three regulators in that it also contains provisions that affect audit 
contracting and independence rules (EC 2012). The EC suggested legislation 
can be viewed as audit industry reforms that contain specific report changes. 
           7
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The PCAOB intends to change the audit reporting model to increase 
transparency and relevance to users (2011b). Similarly, the IAASB intends to 
enhance the value and relevance of the report (2011). In light of the fact that 
users are requesting many of these proposed changes, users and regulators 
may feel that the new disclosures will achieve these goals, but as with many 
policy implementations, there may be both beneficial and detrimental unintended 
consequences. 
 Auditors and management of reporting entities have expressed concern 
about the proposals to expand the audit reporting model while investors are 
generally advocating the expansion (PCAOB 2011d; APB 2013). Auditors appear 
to be advancing four arguments against the adoption of additional audit 
disclosures. First, representatives from the international audit firms in attendance 
at the PCAOB’s roundtable (2011d) expressed concern that audit disclosures 
would change the role of the auditor from providing assurance by attesting to 
information provided by management to acting as a primary source of new 
information and disclosure, a role that audits are not currently designed to fill. 
Further, conflicting messages from management and the auditor could confuse 
less sophisticated (non-professional) investors. This concern has been echoed 
internationally (APB 2013). Second, auditors are concerned about the potential 
for increased litigation. The argument is that the more items auditors are 
responsible for disclosing, the more items they can potentially be held liable for in 
court. Third, auditors at the PCAOB roundtable also cited concerns about time 
and resource constraints. The audit timeline has been compressed in recent 
           8
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years as reporting deadlines have been cut by regulators. Shorter deadlines 
coupled with an increased reporting role would mean that auditors are forced to 
do more work in less time. Some of those in attendance at the roundtable even 
cited concerns that the quality of audit work could suffer as a result (PCAOB 
2011d). Finally, the auditors also expressed concern that fears of increased 
litigation risk coupled with time pressure would lead auditors to rely on boilerplate 
disclosures and language, something regulators and investors generally wish to 
avoid (PCAOB 2011d). 
 Despite the objections of auditors and preparers, high-quality auditors and 
management teams may reap unexpected rewards from expanded audit 
disclosure. For instance, it is common knowledge that an expectations gap exists 
between auditors and users of financial statements (e.g. (McEnroe and Martens 
2001) . The expectations gap can be defined simply as the difference between 
what users believe auditors are responsible for and how they should conduct an 
audit and what the auditors believe they are responsible for and how they 
actually conduct the audit (Humphrey et al. 1992). Prior literature suggests that 
part of the cause of high litigation costs for auditors stems from this expectations 
gap (Porter 1993). One of the regulators’ stated goals for an expanded report is 
to make the auditing process more transparent to users. To the extent that 
additional audit disclosures will incrementally reduce the expectations gap, 
litigation costs could also be reduced. For example, prior work with legal 
professionals indicates that judges give lower assessments of auditor liability 
when the auditor simply discloses the materiality threshold in the audit report 
           9
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(Jennings et al. 1991). Auditors and managers may also underestimate the 
opportunity afforded by additional audit disclosure to demonstrate positive 
attributes such as independence and credibility to users. Discussion of both the 
auditors’ decision making process and management’s reporting positions 
highlights the choices of both parties, allowing users to make more inferences 
about reporting and audit quality. 
A second concern that has not been raised by auditors or users is that the 
disclosure of auditor materiality thresholds causes a fundamental change in the 
operating definition and concept of materiality in accounting. Materiality is defined 
in terms of what matters to reasonable investors and is estimated by auditors and 
preparers in practice (this will be discussed further in the materiality section of 
the literature review). Users anchoring their materiality judgments on the auditor’s 
disclosed materiality level transforms the flow of the materiality decision process. 
Rather than auditors and preparers simply estimating users’ materiality levels, 
auditors gain a position of influence over users’ materiality judgments. By 
showing that users’ materiality judgments change with exposure to the auditor’s 
materiality threshold, I demonstrate a significant, quantitative effect of the 
conceptual shift. 
 
Brief Overview of Experiments and Findings 
The first experiment in this dissertation systematically varies both the 
extent of the auditor’s reported agreement with management’s reporting choices 
and whether management reports in a manner that is consistent with their 
incentives. As a result, I find cases in which expanded audit disclosures cause 
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investors to perceive the management more negatively, but I also find cases in 
which investors view both management and the auditor in a more positive light 
than they would without the disclosures. Specifically, when the auditors 
communicate agreement with management, users rate the auditor as more 
independent because agreement is consistent with the audit opinion, and users’ 
investment in the company’s equity increases. Likewise, when managers choose 
to report inconsistently with their incentives and users’ expectations, users 
attribute the choice to higher management credibility. 
The second experiment tests the effects of a materiality disclosure on 
investors’ materiality judgments. I find that investors anchor their materiality 
judgments on the threshold explicitly disclosed by the auditor, which represents a 
qualitative and quantitative change in the determination of materiality. This, in 
effect, shrinks the expectations gap between auditors and users, resulting in 
greater agreement with the audit report, even when uncorrected misstatements 
below the auditor’s threshold are subsequently disclosed. While this is not a 
direct test of investors’ willingness to pursue litigation, their agreement with the 
audit opinion would reasonably be expected to influence the litigation decision 
(Jennings et al. 1991). However, similar to prior research (Kadous 2000), my 
findings indicate that users ignore audit quality and instead focus on 
misstatement severity when determining the auditor’s liability for misstatements. 
 
Organization 
 The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 
provides a review of literature related to the current debate surrounding 
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proposals to change and expand the audit report, the current state and usage of 
the audit report, and the concept of materiality and its applications and 
interpretations. Chapter 3 relates the pertinent theories and development of 
hypotheses, first for experiment one, followed by those for experiment two. 
Chapter 4 addresses the design, participants, and methodology for both 
experiments. Chapter 5 provides the results and statistical analyses. Chapter 6 
discusses the results and concludes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Audit Report Use and the Expectations Gap 
To my knowledge, the effects on shareholders of the specific audit 
disclosures under consideration by regulators have not been empirically studied 
despite extensive discussion (e.g. the CAQ’s Observations on the Evolving Role 
of the Auditor 2011 and the PCAOB Roundtable on Auditor’s Reporting Model 
2011). However, the accounting literature can speak to potential effects of 
expanded audit disclosure. For example, the effects on users’ perceptions are 
expected to be economically important. Numerous studies show that perceptions 
of audit quality affect prices in financial markets (e.g. Mayhew 2001 and Dee et 
al. 2011). Prior studies have also shown that perceptions of management’s 
credibility can affect stock prices (e.g. Hirst et al. 2007). There may also be 
advantages to increased disclosure for auditors and management that have not 
yet been identified. For example, prior research shows that disclosures and 
accounting choices can improve users’ judgments of managers’ credibility (Clor-
Proell 2009; Hirst et al. 2007; Hodge et al. 2006). Increased audit disclosure may 
similarly impact credibility judgments for both management and auditors. In 
addition, there is a widely recognized expectations gap between auditors and 
users, and the use of audit reports has received much attention in the accounting 
literature. Church et al. (2008) review the literature on report use and find that it 
has symbolic value, but little communicative value. They conclude by calling for 
further research investigating the usefulness of additional report disclosures 
(Church et al. 2008). 
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Auditors can spend thousands of hours investigating the financial 
statements and assertions of management, but ultimately their work is distilled 
into a single audit opinion that often requires no more than four paragraphs on a 
single page to communicate to users. The standard, unqualified auditor’s report 
identifies the statements covered by the report, a brief description of the auditor’s 
work, and the opinion of the auditor that the statements present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position and results of the operations of the entity 
under audit, without qualification. The standard auditor’s report is often viewed as 
a pass/fail model, and does not provide for discussion by the auditor, despite the 
extensive work that goes into the opinion. Not surprisingly, financial statement 
users want more information from their auditors (PCAOB 2011b, 2011d; Mock et 
al. 2009). 
In 1979, Libby set out a model of the report’s effect on financial statement 
users that includes three links (1979). Libby’s model is reproduced in Figure 1 (p. 
100 Libby, 1979). The first link connects the “auditor’s intended message” and 
the “user’s perception of the auditor’s intended message”. The audit expectations 
gap, defined as the difference between what users believe auditors are 
responsible for and how 
Figure 1 – Libby’s 1979 Model of the Effect of the Auditor’s Report 
  
they should conduct an audit and what the auditors believe they are responsible 
for and how they actually conduct the audit (Humphrey et al. 1992), is partly a 
result of the breakdown in this link. Furthermore, the PCAOB, by proposing to 
 Link 1                                Link 2                                Link 3 
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expand the reporting role of the auditor, intends to make the audit report more 
transparent and relevant for financial statement users, i.e., to improve link one by 
allowing the auditor to communicate more clearly with users (PCAOB 2011b). 
Numerous studies examine the state of the current (and prior) audit 
reporting models as well as the expectations gap that exists between users and 
auditors (Church et al. 2008). Today, the general consensus of researchers 
(e.g.(Mock et al. 2009; Turner et al. 2010), users (PCAOB 2011b), and even 
auditors (PCAOB 2011d) is that the current auditor’s reporting model is 
inadequate for users’ needs. 
Libby (1979) compares the perceptions of auditors and loan officers with 
regards to the messages conveyed by various audit reports and finds no 
significant disagreements between them. While Libby’s study examines 
perceptions related to the specific message conveyed by audit reports, Arrington 
et al. (1983) examines differences in auditors’ and users’ causal attributions after 
an audit failure. They find that users are more likely than certified public 
accountants (CPAs – auditors are a subpopulation of CPAs) to blame the auditor 
for an audit failure. Specifically, the CPAs surveyed consider compliance with 
generally accepted auditing standards an important factor in exonerating the 
auditor whereas users do not (Arrington et al. 1983). This has important 
implications for the current reporting model because the current model focuses 
on defining the scope of an audit and the auditor’s performance in terms of 
generally accepted auditing standards. 
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Gul (1987) shows that loan officers perceive more risk and demand more 
information when the borrower receives a qualified audit report2. Robertson et al. 
(1988) demonstrate that modifications to the then current reporting language 
could improve users’ understanding and satisfaction with audit reports. 
Subsequent to their study, required reporting language changed, and in 1990, 
Pringle et al. investigated the effects of the change (1990). They found that for 
certain situations, the adopted reporting requirements were more ambiguous 
than the prior requirements because the new model combined elements of an 
unqualified opinion and a qualified opinion. This is of concern to the current 
debate because auditors argue that expanded disclosures could similarly blur the 
distinction between unqualified and qualified audit reports by discussing items 
that appear to be material problems, but in the auditor’s opinion do not require a 
qualification on the audit report. 
The current audit reporting model is meant to convey the level of 
assurance provided by an audit3. Epstein and Geiger (1994) demonstrate the 
expectations gap in auditing by highlighting the differences between the level of 
assurance auditors provide (reasonable assurance) and the level users believe 
auditors provide. The results of their survey show that 47% of users expect 
                                                            
2 In an unqualified opinion, the auditor states that the financial statements present fairly, in all 
material respects, the financial position of the company, without any exceptions or qualifications 
on the opinion. It is sometimes referred to as a “clean” audit opinion. A qualified opinion indicates 
that there is at least one exception to the auditor’s opinion that the financial statements of the 
company are fairly presented in all material respects (i.e. there is at least one significant problem 
with the financial statements). A third type of audit opinion is the adverse opinion. In the adverse 
opinion, the auditor states that the financial statements do NOT present fairly, in all material 
respects, the financial position of the company. 
3 The level of assurance audits are meant to provide is “reasonable assurance”. Reasonable 
assurance is defined as a high, but not absolute, level of assurance that the financial statements 
are not materially misstated. However, the current report does not quantitatively define 
reasonable assurance or materiality for the reader.  
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absolute assurance that the financial statements are free from errors and an 
astounding 71% of users expect absolute assurance that the financial statements 
are free from the effects of fraud (Epstein and Geiger 1994). 
McEnroe and Martens (2001) survey audit partners and individual 
investors regarding their views of the audit report and the audit function. Similar 
to Epstein and Geiger (1994), they find that users expect a higher level of 
assurance from auditors than audits are meant to provide. Of particular note, 
they find that over 60% of individual investors agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement that an unqualified audit opinion indicates that every item of 
importance to investors and creditors has been disclosed in the financial 
statements (McEnroe and Martens 2001). 
Despite evidence of the existence of an expectations gap, there is also 
evidence that the current auditor’s reporting model is useful in making investment 
and credit decisions. Gomez-Guillamon (2003) finds that both lenders and 
investors find the auditor’s report useful in making lending and investing 
decisions and that it even has some impact on the specific dollar amounts 
invested in the company. However, while still considered useful, Mock et al. 
(2009) find that many users simply view the unqualified auditor’s report as a 
pass/fail proposition. In fact, in the focus groups conducted by Mock et al. (2009), 
users note that the report could be replaced by a simple “OK” stamp of approval. 
The Mock et al. (2009) study deserves further consideration. The study 
was commissioned by the Auditing Standards Board and the International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. It is a relatively recent, extensive, and 
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detailed look at users’ perceptions of the current auditor reporting model used in 
the United States and two similar models used around the world. There are two 
stated goals for the study: to investigate the perceptions of stakeholders related 
to the auditor’s report and to investigate the way in which stakeholders use the 
report in decision making. Mock et al. use focus groups consisting of five different 
categories of stakeholders including preparers (Chief Financial Officers), bank 
lenders, financial analysts, non-professional investors, and auditors to investigate 
perceptions of the standard auditor’s report. They also use verbal protocol 
analysis in conjunction with a stock valuation task to investigate the effect the 
report has on the decision making process of the different stakeholders. Both the 
focus-group and verbal protocol analysis confirm that financial statement users 
value the auditor’s report. The verbal protocol analysis shows that the auditor’s 
report is specifically used as a signal of the reliability and completeness of the 
financial statements under consideration. Also, analysts consider the lack of an 
auditor’s report to be a serious red flag, but once provided with the report, 
analysts do not change their valuations in any way (Mock et al. 2009). This lends 
credence to the PCAOB’s (2011b) notion that the relevance of the auditor’s 
report can be increased. 
Two findings from Mock et al. (2009) that are particularly important for the 
present study relate to stakeholders’ perceptions of the level of assurance 
provided by the audit report. First, stakeholders agree that the level of assurance 
is very closely tied to the auditor’s materiality threshold, so much so that the 
materiality level and level of assurance are considered synonymous. While the 
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current auditor’s reporting model provides “reasonable assurance,” materiality is 
not disclosed. Thus, the stakeholders do not have a firm understanding of what 
level of assurance is actually provided. When asked what materiality thresholds 
used by auditors might look like, the responses (from the non-auditor groups) 
varied widely. They also varied among the auditor group (Mock et al. 2009). The 
findings suggest that in order for users to understand the level of assurance 
provided by an audit, the materiality threshold actually used by the auditor would 
need to be disclosed4. Second, one of the analysts present suggests something 
very similar to the AD&A under consideration by the PCAOB (p. 4 Mock et al. 
2009): 
“Another analyst said in addition to the company's 
disclosures of how they selected specific estimates and their 
judgments, analysts also would like a similar discussion from 
the auditor. For example, what did the auditor propose to the 
client as adjustments, why did they propose those 
adjustments, and if they were rejected by the client, why 
were they rejected?” 
 
Materiality 
The specific effects of materiality disclosures have been studied in the 
past, though not extensively. In fact, reviews of the materiality literature by 
Holstrum and Messier (1982) and Messier et al. (2005) point out that very little is 
understood about users’ materiality-related decisions or the effects of preparer 
and auditor materiality decisions on users (1982; Messier et al. 2005). On the 
other hand, there is a vast literature related to the more general questions of how 
                                                            
4 The international framework for assurance engagements may do a better job of defining both 
reasonable and limited assurance without respect to a quantitative materiality threshold and by 
directly contrasting the two levels of assurance in an easily accessible format (IAASB 2004). 
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materiality judgments and decisions are made by auditors as well as what auditor 
and user levels are, generally. However, as Messier et al. point out, there are 
many questions left to answer before materiality and its use by auditors and 
financial statement user is fully understood (2005). 
The concept of materiality is ubiquitous in the realm of accounting 
(Frishkoff 1970; Rose et al. 1970). It is vitally important to preparers, auditors, 
and users of financial information. Because of its importance, the PCAOB, the 
SEC, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the Supreme Court 
of the United States have all provided definitions. These definitions are quite 
consistent and frequently reference each other. The PCAOB defines materiality 
in Auditing Standard No. 11, Consideration of Materiality in Planning and 
Performing an Audit. The PCAOB cites the Supreme Court of the United States 
(from TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 1979) for a definition of 
materiality as:  
“A substantial likelihood that the… fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' 
of information made available." 
 
The SEC defines materiality in Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 (1999): 
“Materiality concerns the significance of an item to users of a 
registrant's financial statements. A matter is "material" if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it 
important.” 
SAB No. 99 also refers to the FASB’s definition of materiality. The FASB’s 
definition is found in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, and is 
stated as: 
“The omission or misstatement of an item in a financial report is 
material if, in the light of surrounding circumstances, the magnitude 
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of the item is such that it is probable that the judgment of a 
reasonable person relying upon the report would have been 
changed or influenced by the inclusion or correction of the item.” 
 While these definitions of materiality are clearly centered on the needs of 
financial statement users, many parties make materiality judgments for a variety 
of purposes. Preparers make materiality decisions each time they decide what 
items to record in the financial statements (Frishkoff 1970). Auditors judge 
materiality during the planning stages of an audit, during the performance of the 
audit, and when rendering a final audit opinion on the financial statements 
(PCAOB 2010a, 2010b). Both management and auditors are responsible for 
estimating whether an item would matter to a reasonable investor, either due to 
its size (quantitatively) or due to the nature of the item (qualitatively – e.g., is an 
error due to fraud or a mistake?). Users must make their own materiality 
judgments when analyzing financial statements for investing and lending 
decisions as well as when evaluating management and the auditor, and exact 
materiality thresholds are likely unique to each user. Finally, third parties may be 
called upon to make materiality decisions as well, such as lawyers, judges, and 
jurors faced with audit related lawsuits (Jennings et al. 1987; Jennings et al. 
1991). 
 All stakeholders seem to be in difficult positions when it comes to making 
materiality judgments. While there are widely accepted conceptual definitions of 
materiality, there are no explicit quantitative standards. At first glance, it would 
appear that users are in the best position when it comes to making materiality 
judgments – after all, materiality is defined in relation to the information they 
would choose to use. However, while users may know what they consider to be 
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material, they do not know what preparers and auditors consider material, nor do 
they know the precision of the financial information they must evaluate and rely 
on in the decision making process (Mock et al. 2009). On the other hand, 
auditors and preparers must assess and use materiality thresholds based on 
users’ requirements without more than a general knowledge of the users’ 
materiality thresholds and decision models (Jaedicke 1970). Ultimately, the 
materiality threshold is a matter of professional judgment, despite the prevalence 
of some basic quantitative (e.g. 5% of net income) and qualitative (e.g. fraud by 
upper management, changing a loss to income) thresholds. However, the 
PCAOB rejects common quantitative thresholds as the sole determining factor of 
whether an auditor or preparer classifies an item as material in AS No. 14 
(PCAOB 2010b). To make matters worse, auditors and preparers may be held 
legally accountable for their materiality decisions by parties in the legal 
profession (lawyers and judges) who must make their own independent 
materiality judgments (Jennings et al. 1991). These difficulties lead to three 
important questions that have been addressed repeatedly in the accounting 
literature: 1) How do the various parties go about making materiality judgments? 
2) Are there any generalizable quantitative and qualitative thresholds that 
emerge from these processes, and if so, what are they? 3) What level of 
agreement exists among the various parties regarding materiality? 
Although pinning down a hard and fast rule for materiality thresholds 
appears impossible, past research has examined the ways in which different 
stakeholders determine materiality as well as measures of central tendency for 
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materiality thresholds within various stakeholder groups. Perhaps the first of the 
studies aimed at determining quantitative materiality thresholds was a survey 
reported by Woolsey in 1954. Woolsey reported that 72% of all respondents 
(users, preparers, and auditors) were primarily concerned with a number’s size 
relative to current year net income, and that the materiality threshold was 
generally between 5% and 15% of net income (Woolsey 1954). 
 Rose et al. (1970) examined full and part-time MBA students’ reactions to 
earnings per share (EPS)5 comparisons. They found that their subjects reacted 
to changes in EPS starting at 6.6% to 7.0%. Importantly, they also find evidence 
consistent with user’s materiality judgments following the Weber-Fechner Law of 
stimulus response (Rose et al. 1970). The Weber-Fechner Law states that “the 
change in intensity of a stimulus necessary before it can be detected is a 
constant function of the amount of stimuli present,” (p. 141, 1970). If this is the 
case, then users will respond to 6.6% – 7.0% changes in EPS regardless of the 
nominal amount of EPS. 
 When the Rose et al. study was published in the Journal of Accounting 
Research, two commentaries were published alongside it. Jaedicke criticized the 
study because, while it demonstrated the change in EPS required for participants 
to respond that the two EPS numbers were different, it did not ask the 
participants to make any decisions with this information, despite the fact that 
materiality seems to be defined by the information’s ability to impact a 
reasonable user’s decision regarding the reporting entity (1970). In summary, the 
                                                            
5 Earnings per share is calculated as the net income available to pay dividends to common 
stockholders divided by a company’s weighted average shares of common stock outstanding 
during the year. 
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Rose et al. study may inform us of users’ ability to differentiate EPS numbers, but 
it does not tell us when that difference changes their investment decisions. 
Johnson’s (1970) commentary further criticizes the Rose et al. study for what 
Johnson considers lapses in the data analysis. 
 Boatsman and Robertson (1974) performed an experiment with CPAs and 
securities analysts to capture both the process for determining materiality as well 
as a general materiality threshold. They investigated eight variables over 30 
cases, all of which were administered to 33 subjects (18 CPAs and 15 analysts). 
The multivariate model was 84% accurate in discriminating between material and 
immaterial items as judged by the participants. They found that three variables 
accounted for 99% of the predictive power in their model. Specifically an item’s 
percentage of net income accounted for 73% of the predictive power, the nature 
of the item as either a gain or loss on non-current assets accounted for 24% of 
the predictive power, and the overall risk of the entity accounted for an additional 
2%. The apparent dividing line for percentage of net income was calculated as 
4%; items under 4% of net income were generally not considered material. Also, 
Boatsman and Robertson found that CPAs and analysts did not differ in their 
decision models in any meaningful way, indicating that CPAs are fairly well 
calibrated when it comes to assessing materiality with regard to professional 
users (1974). 
Frishkoff examined audit reports from 1963 and compared those receiving 
qualified opinions due to material changes in accounting methods to those that 
received unqualified opinions. Frishkoff identified two quantitative factors and one 
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qualitative factor in the materiality decision. Frishkoff found that the size of the 
change in accounting method relative to net income and firm size were the two 
most important quantitative factors in the materiality decision (1970). Auditors 
considered whether or not the accounting change was a simple reclassification 
(which would not affect net income) as a qualitative factor in their decision 
(Frishkoff 1970). 
 Firth (1979) asked practicing auditors, chief accountants (preparers), and 
securities analysts in the United Kingdom to make materiality assessments in 30 
hypothetical cases involving extraordinary items. He found that as a group, 
preparers had the highest materiality thresholds while analysts had the lowest, 
with auditors in between. Furthermore, there was substantial individual variance 
within occupation groups, though at a firm level there were no significant 
differences among the auditors from the three audit firms Firth sampled. Of the 
variables investigated, Firth found the item’s size as a percentage of net income 
was the most important variable in determining whether it would be judged 
material by all three groups (auditors, preparers, and users) (1979). In contrast to 
Boatsman and Robertson’s findings in the United States, Firth concludes that 
preparers and auditors are not meeting the information needs of users. 
 Steinbart (1987) studied the process auditors use for determining planning 
materiality extensively. In fact, the paper reports the development of an expert 
system with the help of an audit partner through an interactive field study. While 
the study provides a significant amount of knowledge about how auditors develop 
planning materiality, there is no information about the levels or methods auditors 
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use to judge materiality at the evaluation stage of an audit or how this might 
match up with users’ materiality levels and methods. However, it is important to 
note that one of the basic rules within the expert system Steinbart developed is a 
5% of net income rule for planning materiality if certain criteria are met (1987). 
This seems reasonable in light of past research. 
 Icerman and Hillison (1991) studied the evaluative materiality judgments 
of Big 8 auditors by reviewing errors detected and documented in the working 
papers of manufacturing audits. Icerman and Hillison performed a logit 
regression on the decision to require correction of an error and found that the 
relative size of an error was the most important variable in the decision. They 
note that the relative size thresholds of evaluative materiality judgments do not 
appear to follow a linear model. Rather, the threshold increases more slowly than 
the client’s net income (Icerman and Hillison 1991). As a result, they do not 
describe a specific percentage of net income as a materiality threshold. 
Interestingly, their data on the size of errors relative to total revenues shows that 
of 699 waived errors, only 14 (2%) were larger than 1% of the client’s revenue 
while 492 (70%) were 0.05% of total revenue or less. In contrast, 134 errors 
greater than 1% of revenue were corrected (Icerman and Hillison 1991). To 
provide perspective, there were only 148 instances of errors larger than 1% of 
total revenue, thus the booking rate was just over 90%. While no hard and fast 
rules for materiality judgments are apparent from the Icerman and Hillison study, 
it does appear that there is widespread agreement for materiality decisions when 
errors are particularly large or small.  
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Two studies conducted by Jennings et al. (1987; 1991) contrast the 
materiality judgments of auditors with those of lawyers and judges. Like 
preparers and auditors, lawyers and judges must also make materiality decisions 
in their professional roles when lawsuits are brought against auditors. 
Specifically, lawyers and judges are tasked with making a judgment as to what 
level of information is reasonable for a user to expect; lawyers do so when 
deciding whether to bring a suit and judges do so in deciding cases (Jennings et 
al. 1991). Thus, Jennings et al. (1991) argue that the materiality judgments of 
lawyers and judges may be good proxies for judgments of financial statement 
users and that the judgments of lawyers and judges are economically important 
to both auditors and preparers. In the first study, Jennings et al. constructed five 
hypothetical cases involving issues of inventory obsolescence, an extraordinary 
loss (an eminent domain seizure), a contingent liability (lawsuit), and an illegal 
act (bribe). They then asked 121 CPAs, 90 attorneys, and 56 judges to respond 
whether disclosure was required at each of six different dollar amounts while net 
income was held constant. Simply put, the findings show that there is wide 
variance between the materiality judgments of auditors and legal professionals, 
although, as the authors point out, interpretation of their results is sometimes 
difficult at first glance. As an example, the authors cite the case in which CPAs 
and legal professionals appear to be closest in their materiality judgments. In the 
example, 57% of the auditors surveyed believed a loss from obsolete inventory of 
10% of net income would be material, and 57% of the legal professionals also 
believed such a misstatement would be material. However, the authors caution 
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against interpreting the findings to mean that there is agreement between CPAs 
and legal professionals. Even in this example, 43% of CPAs would not disclose 
the amount, but 57% of legal professionals believe it should be disclosed, 
indicating that there is neither wide agreement within the two groups, nor 
between the two groups. The study also finds a large difference of opinion 
regarding qualitative thresholds for disclosure. The authors give the example that 
60% of judges believed that lawsuits should always be disclosed, regardless of 
size, while only 5% of CPAs agreed (Jennings et al. 1987). 
While there appears to be a wide gap in materiality judgments between 
CPAs and legal professionals, Jennings et al. (1991) test a method of reducing 
this gap. First, it should be noted that 61% of lawyers and 72% of judges believe 
that explicit materiality standards should be promulgated and used in the 
accounting profession, whereas only 18% of CPAs agree (1987). Second, when 
Jennings et al. asked judges to make liability judgments in a hypothetical auditing 
case, adding language to the auditor’s report that listed an explicit materiality 
threshold (10% of net income) significantly reduced the judges’ liability judgments 
against the auditors. While auditors appear resistant to specific standards, these 
findings suggest that such standards (if adhered to) could benefit auditors in 
court. This finding is particularly important for my second experiment in that it 
implies that user groups may be willing to accept auditors’ definitions of 
materiality even if their independent judgments would differ from those of the 
auditors. 
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Bernardi and Pincus (1996) examined the materiality decisions of 
managers on an audit case based on real audit clients. They identify 10 general 
rules of thumb for making materiality judgments from prior literature and compare 
the performance of 154 audit managers to those rules. They find that 75% of 
managers identified a quantitative materiality threshold that fit within the upper 
and lower bounds suggested by the ten rules (Bernardi and Pincus 1996). While 
their findings suggest that a set of ten general rules effectively describe 75% of 
audit managers’ materiality judgments, this does not necessarily indicate a high 
level of agreement on the actual threshold. In fact, the upper and lower bounds of 
materiality indicated by the ten rules in the experimental audit case were 
$122,000 and $286,000 respectively (Bernardi and Pincus 1996). The range is 
larger than the lower bound, indicating that auditors could have significant 
disagreements about the materiality threshold. In fact, when the distribution of all 
responses is considered, the maximum number of managers within any 
$100,000 interval was only 42%. 
Wright and Wright (1997) examine materiality judgments in the specific 
context of an auditor’s decision to waive a proposed adjustment. They use 
archival data from actual audit working papers collected from a single national 
firm. Specifically, they requested information on the four largest proposed 
adjustments over 20% of materiality that were not related to adjustments 
routinely proposed by the auditor for that client. They received data from 186 
audits. Each response included information on the accounts affected, the size of 
the proposed adjustment, the nature of the item (subjectively or objectively 
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determined), the level of planning materiality, and the decision to report or waive 
the item (Wright and Wright 1997). As expected, the proposed adjustments’ 
relation to materiality was significant in explaining the decision to record the 
adjustment (“book” the adjustment) or not (“waive” the adjustment), with larger 
adjustments being more likely to be booked. Wright and Wright also found that a 
number of other factors were significant as well, such as whether the amount of 
the adjustment can be objectively (as opposed to subjectively) determined, the 
size and direction of the adjustment’s affect on net income, and the size of the 
client. Perhaps the most startling finding of the study is that 47.5% of waived 
adjustments were larger than planning materiality (Wright and Wright 1997). 
In a follow-up study, Joe, Wright, and Wright investigate audit adjustments 
by a Big 4 firm during 2002, a particularly high-risk time period for auditors due to 
the Enron scandal. They find that just 24% of the adjustments in the sample were 
waived compared to 67% in the 1997 study, and, contrary to prior studies, they 
find that materiality is not a determining factor in the book/waive decision (Joe et 
al. 2011). 
The results of the Wright and Wright (1997) and Joe et al. (2011) studies 
are vitally important in light of regulators’ proposals to expand the auditor’s report 
due to the array of factors that apparently enter into the auditors’ decision to 
require an adjustment. For instance, if Wright and Wright had found that 
materiality was the lone factor in the auditor’s decision to waive an adjustment, it 
might be enough for the PCAOB to simply require that auditors disclose their 
quantitative materiality thresholds to users. However, clearly there are qualitative 
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factors and other considerations that enter into the decision making process, 
enough so that materiality is not a factor in the 2011 study and even 
quantitatively material adjustments are waived with non-trivial frequency in the 
1997 study (Wright and Wright 1997; Joe et al. 2011). An expanded report might 
allow auditors to inform investors of the reasons behind their decisions related to 
important proposed adjustments as well as allowing the investor a basis to make 
their own judgments. 
A number of conclusions can be reached from past research. First, there 
is evidence that materiality is judged differently by each individual decision 
maker, even when general guidelines may be present (Firth 1979). Second, there 
seems to be a consensus that materiality levels depend in part on the decisions 
the materiality level will be used for (Jaedicke 1970; Firth 1979; Steinbart 1987). 
Third, while there is some understanding regarding the general rules and factors 
that auditors consider in setting materiality limits, (Hicks 1964; Frishkoff 1970; 
Boatsman and Robertson 1974; Firth 1979; Jennings et al. 1987; Steinbart 1987; 
Wright and Wright 1997), there is mixed evidence regarding whether auditors’ 
materiality judgments match those of investors (Woolsey 1954; Jennings et al. 
1991; Fisher 1990; Tuttle et al. 2002; Cho et al. 2003). In summary, it seems 
likely that there are cases in which auditors and preparers do not assess 
materiality at a level that a majority of users would agree with, and in doing so, 
they use a number of qualitative and quantitative criteria that are not currently 
disclosed to users. This mismatch between auditors’ and users’ decision 
outcomes and criteria brings us to one of the current questions before regulators 
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of whether or not materiality should be disclosed to users of financial statements 
(PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2012; APB 2013). 
I am only aware of three studies from the extensive materiality literature 
that directly address the question of the effect of auditors’ materiality thresholds 
on financial statement users, Fisher 1990, Tuttle et al. 2002, and an unpublished 
working paper from 2007 by Davis cited in the literature review by Church et al 
(2008). Of these three, only Fisher (1990) and Davis (2007) directly address the 
question of public disclosure to users. 
Fisher (1990) runs an experimental market using double auctions and 
finds that when materiality levels are disclosed publicly, market efficiency 
increases (i.e., prices move toward the theoretical value of the asset) compared 
to when materiality levels are not disclosed or disclosed to a subset of investors. 
The theoretical underpinning of the study is that disclosing materiality allows 
users to better assess the extent of three information attributes of the financial 
statements and audit report: noise (unintentional error), bias, and fineness 
(degree of informativeness). Reporting materiality gives users better information 
about the relative quality of the financial statements, increasing the efficiency of 
the market (Fisher 1990). 
While appreciative of Fisher’s study, a discussion piece by a practicing 
audit partner (Jackson 1990) was also critical on a number of issues. First, 
Jackson noted that dividends in the Fisher study were a step function of income. 
As a result, supposedly immaterial errors could push the dividend policy up or 
down one step. The example Jackson gave was that a $1 change in income from 
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$60 to $61 resulted in a 40% increase in dividends, yet materiality thresholds in 
the study were set at $3 and $6. Jackson noted that most auditors, if they knew 
of such a dividend function would reduce their materiality decisions accordingly 
(Jackson 1990). The second major criticism was that the Fisher study contained 
an internal conceptual contradiction from the outset. The study was set up in 
such a way that Fisher was looking for a market affect caused by a supposedly 
immaterial disclosure, but by all user-centered definitions of materiality, an error 
in reported earnings that is large enough to influence market behavior is material 
(Jackson 1990). 
While I understand Jackson’s criticism on this front, I have a different take 
on the situation embodied in the Fisher study. Fisher’s research question is 
whether or not disclosing auditor determined materiality levels will affect 
investors’ behavior in the market (Fisher 1990). Jackson seems to implicitly 
assume that auditors are able to set materiality thresholds that match those of 
users. Based on the results of the study, I would suggest that Fisher actually 
tested a special case of her research question, the case where auditor 
determined materiality levels do not match users’. Research prior to (Jaedicke 
1970; Firth 1979; Jennings et al. 1987) and since (Jennings et al. 1991; Cho et 
al. 2003) Fisher’s study demonstrate that this is a realistic and appropriate 
scenario to study rather than constituting an internal contradiction. In fact, it 
seems that disclosure would be most relevant when materiality judgments differ 
between auditors and users. However, even assuming that auditors and users 
agree on materiality levels, disclosure of this fact might be expected to move 
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markets if investors are building their uncertainty about auditor materiality levels 
into asset prices as part of an information risk premium. In the absence of 
knowledge about the auditor’s materiality level, investors run the risk that their 
materiality levels differ and that a misstatement considered immaterial by the 
auditor (but material to the user) in fact exists. 
Church et al. (2008) cite a study similar to Fisher’s conducted by Davis 
and reported in an unpublished 2007 working paper. According to Church et al. 
(2008), in Davis’s study public disclosure of materiality is compared to no 
disclosure with a manipulation for the level of materiality. Similar to Fisher, Davis 
also finds that investor expectations of firm performance are improved, which 
improves market efficiency (Church et al. 2008). 
Finally, Tuttle et al. (2002) directly test the effect of seeded misstatements 
corresponding to commonly used auditor materiality thresholds on stock prices 
determined in an experimental economics setting using a double-auction market. 
They define common auditor materiality levels both “conservatively” (5% of 
income and 0.25% of sales) and “liberally” (10% of net income and 0.5% of 
sales). They find that misstatements within even liberal definitions of materiality 
have no significant effect on market prices. Only when misstatements are 
increased to three to five times conventional materiality levels (30% of income 
and 1.25% of sales) do misstatements significantly affect market prices (Tuttle et 
al. 2002). The conclusion is that conventional materiality thresholds used by 
auditors are likely sufficient. The results provide some reassurance that 
uncorrected misstatements below commonly employed materiality thresholds do 
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not significantly affect market prices when auditors adhere to them. However, as 
previously discussed, Wright and Wright (1997) show that auditors sometimes 
stray when evaluating misstatements. This study provides no reassurance for 
cases where auditors stray from their own thresholds such as the 47% of waived 
items above planning materiality levels identified in Wright and Wright (1997). In 
addition, Tuttle et al. do not explore how far beyond the liberal constructions of 
materiality auditors can go before they affect market prices, as the gap between 
10% of income and 0.5% of sales and 30% of income and 1.25% of sales is not 
tested. When auditors do stray from conventional levels of materiality it may be 
particularly important to disclose the ex-post materiality thresholds actually 
employed in light of Fisher’s (1990) findings. 
In direct contrast to the results obtained by Tuttle et al., Cho et al. (2003) 
find significant differences between conventional materiality levels and levels that 
affect real-world markets. Cho et al. take a market-based approach to identifying 
users’ materiality thresholds with archival data. By examining cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) around earnings surprises and splitting their sample by 
levels of earnings surprise, they are able to isolate thresholds for three common 
materiality constructions, percentage of net income, percentage of sales, and 
percentage of total assets. For example, they look at CAR as a function of the 
interaction of earnings surprise and an indicator variable for whether the absolute 
value of the surprise amount is above or below a cutoff percentage of total 
assets. The regression model with subscripts for firm and year excluded is: 
CAR = α + β1SUE*(Below_n%Assets) + β2SUE*(Above_n%Assets) + ε 
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Where CAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return adjusted for market 
returns and SUE is the earnings surprise measured as the difference between 
the most recent consensus analyst forecast and actual earnings. Cho et al. 
continue to reduce n until they find an n for which β1 is insignificant but β2 is 
significant. This indicates that users’ materiality thresholds lie somewhere 
between the first n for which β1 is insignificant and the last n for which both β1 
and β2 are significant (Cho et al. 2003). According to the authors, the design is 
intended to guarantee that investors’ true materiality thresholds are no higher 
than those identified by the model. Based on the empirical findings, investors 
react to low levels of earnings surprises – levels far lower than even conservative 
auditor materiality conventions. The identified materiality thresholds are between 
0.1% and 0.2% of pre-tax income, below 0.01% of sales (depending on the sales 
measure), and between 0.1% and 0.25% of total assets (Cho et al. 2003). These 
findings contrast starkly with the Tuttle et al. findings that materiality levels 
several times larger than even liberal conventions are required before the 
experimental market reacted significantly. 
While studies such as those by Fisher (1990), Tuttle et al. (2002), and Cho 
et al. (2003) are important in considering the effect of materiality disclosures on 
market behavior, they do not consider a number of important issues related to 
publicly disclosing auditors' materiality decisions. For instance, they do not 
address any changes in investors’ materiality judgments caused by the 
disclosure of auditors' judgments. Nor do they address how investors’ 
perceptions of audit quality might change in light disclosed materiality levels. 
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However, it is not certain ex ante that materiality disclosures will affect investors’ 
materiality judgments. It is possible that investors develop their materiality 
thresholds based solely on pertinent financial information, which will be 
unchanged by the auditor’s disclosure. 
There are reasons to believe that disclosing auditor materiality decisions 
would be beneficial for users. Materiality decisions affect the amount of 
information conveyed through the financial statements to users (Lev 1968). For 
example, when two account balances are aggregated for presentation in the 
financial statements, information contained in the original accounting records is 
lost in the aggregation (Lev 1968). Providing users with information about the 
extent of information loss allows them to better assess the risk associated with a 
given investment, which in turn increases efficiency in a market setting (Fisher 
1990). In addition, disclosing materiality allows the investor some ability to 
assess the precision and scope of the audit that is ostensibly performed on their 
behalf. Without knowing what materiality thresholds were used in the preparation 
of the financial statements and the audit, users cannot determine how much 
information may have been lost, and as a result, it becomes more difficult for 
users to hold management, the auditor, and their elected board representatives 
accountable for reporting and for audit decisions that they may not agree with. It 
makes sense then that this information loss should be recognized and 
communicated to users. 
Disclosing materiality levels may even be beneficial for auditors when 
facing litigation because it has been shown to reduce judges’ assessments of 
           37
 38 
 
auditor liability for uncorrected misstatements, even when the auditor knew about 
the misstatement (Jennings et al. 1987). Disclosing materiality decisions may 
also help reduce the expectations gap between users and auditors by tempering 
users’ expectations. The expectations gap has been partially blamed for the large 
number of lawsuits and judgments against auditors (Porter 1993). 
There are also likely to be some adverse consequences associated with 
disclosing auditor materiality thresholds. Because auditors have been 
documented to waive adjustments larger than planning materiality (Wright and 
Wright 1997), acknowledging and disclosing a particular threshold may be 
problematic for auditors. Also, auditors argue that disclosing a materiality 
threshold might increase litigation against because any uncorrected or 
undetected misstatements above a disclosed threshold would be easy targets for 
lawsuits (PCAOB 2011d). 
Beyond litigation concerns, disclosing auditor materiality decisions to 
users may fundamentally change the operational definition of materiality. As 
previously described, materiality is currently defined by what matters to users of 
financial statements. Preparers and auditors are tasked with using judgment to 
try to approximate what they believe would be material to investors. However, 
there are good reasons to believe that once auditor materiality judgments are 
disclosed, users’ personal materiality judgments will be affected. This changes 
the dynamic from a user-centered materiality environment to a situation in which 
auditors and preparers actually determine materiality and then influence the 
materiality judgments of users (either intentionally or unintentionally). For 
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example, Pinsker et al. (2009) find evidence that users anchor on the first 
qualitative disclosures they read in a list of disclosures. As a result, the later 
disclosures carry less weight (i.e. are less material) for the users’ decisions. This 
is evidence that users are already influenced by the order of disclosures, and 
Pinsker et al. (2009) express concern that preparers and auditors could use this 
to their advantage. Similarly, it is a key hypothesis of experiment two that users 
will anchor on quantitative materiality disclosures as well. This topic will be 
addressed further in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Theory 
This dissertation will utilize two experiments, each focusing on different 
theories and predicted effects of audit disclosures on users’ perceptions. First, 
the effect of audit disclosures related to management estimates on users’ 
perceptions of reporting accuracy, audit quality, and risk may be predicted from 
the application of Attribution Theory (Kelley 1973) and Support Theory (Tversky 
and Koehler 1994). Second, the explicit or implicit disclosure of the auditor’s 
assessed materiality levels is expected to affect users’ materiality judgments due 
to an anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). 
 
Experiment One: Attribution Theory 
Attribution Theory, as described by Kelley is “a theory about how people 
make causal explanations” (1973, p.107). When we observe certain behavior 
from a person (e.g. management’s conservative reporting choice for a 
transaction), Attribution Theory attempts to explain whether we will attribute the 
cause to a property of that person (e.g. management reports conservatively 
because they are conservative), the situation (e.g. management reports 
conservatively because standards require it), or a specific combination of the two 
(e.g. management reports this particular transaction conservatively, though it is 
not required). 
As Kelley describes in his 1973 formulation of Attribution Theory, there are 
two general cases under which individuals make causal attributions. Case one is 
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the case in which the person making the causal attribution (observer) can draw 
conclusions from multiple observations of an event. Case two is the case in 
which the observer makes a causal attribution from a single instance of an event. 
Both cases may apply in a financial reporting scenario depending on how the 
event of interest is defined. For example, if receiving an unqualified audit report is 
considered the event of interest then observers may be able to review reports for 
multiple years for a single company. On the other hand, if the observer is 
interested in an auditor’s opinion on a specific unusual transaction (as might be 
covered in an expanded report), then the observer may only have one instance 
to consider because unusual transactions, by their very nature, rarely occur for a 
given company and auditor combination. Case one and case two scenarios have 
different implications for the process of causal attribution (Kelley 1973). 
When observers have multiple observations available, the causal 
attribution process behaves similarly to an informal assessment of covariance 
among four factors. Kelley labels these factors as the event, person, entity, and 
time (1973). The event is the result of the cause that the observer is trying to 
identify. The person and entity are the actor and the recipient of an action, 
respectively. Time is represented by multiple instances of the event. A simple 
example will illustrate these four factors. Consider the following case: “Each time 
Audit Firm A audited Company B’s financial statements, Firm A gave an 
unqualified opinion.” In this case the event is Firm A opining. Firm A is the 
person, and the entity is the set of financial statements. Time is represented by 
           41
 42 
 
multiple observations – Firm A gave B’s financials a clean opinion each time they 
were audited. 
It is difficult for observers to make causal attributions in such a simple 
case because of the limited variation and information. The cause of the opinion 
could be due to a characteristic of the financials (they are fairly presented in 
accordance with GAAP), of Firm A (all of Firm A’s opinions are unqualified), or a 
combination (Firm A happens to find that B’s financial statements are fairly 
presented in accordance with GAAP). Another potential cause that is ruled out in 
this case is that Firm A happens to believe the financials are free of material 
misstatement due to the circumstances at a specific time. This cause is ruled out 
because Firm A provides a clean opinion each time it audits B’s financials. If the 
case is changed such that many auditors give an unqualified opinion on B’s 
financials, observers will generally attribute the cause to a property of the B’s 
financials. Because the unqualified opinion is present regardless of the person 
and time, the only remaining cause is a property of the financials – they must be 
presented fairly in accordance with GAAP. Similarly, Firm A – but no other audit 
firm – provides a clean opinion each time it audits Company B, the clean opinion 
will be attributed to some characteristic of Firm A because the variation in firm is 
the only variation that coincides with the variation of the event (a clean opinion 
only occurs when Firm A audits B and not when other auditors audit B). Kelley 
notes that attribution in case one scenarios is driven by the covariation principle 
which he states simply as: “An effect is attributed to the one of its possible 
causes with which, over time, it covaries” (1973). 
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Attributions in a case two scenario are more complex. While attributions in 
case one scenarios are driven by the covariation of factors over multiple events, 
attributions in case two scenarios are driven by the configuration of factors in a 
single event. So, while the covariation principle is the only principle at work in 
case one, there are two principles at work in case two attributions, the 
discounting principle and the augmentation principle (Kelley 1973). The 
discounting principle as stated by Kelley is as follows: “The role of a given cause 
in producing a given effect is discounted if other possible causes are also 
present” (Kelley 1973, p. 113). The augmentation principle can be stated as 
follows: The role of a given cause in producing a given effect is heightened if 
inhibitory causes are also present (Kelley 1973). 
To illustrate these principles Kelley turns to a study conducted by Thibaut 
and Riecken published in 1955. Thibaut and Riecken present observers with two 
scenarios. In the first, a lower status person acts in accordance with the 
preferences of a higher status person, and the observers are asked to attribute 
the cause of the behavior. It is possible that the low-status person’s behavior 
reflects an internal cause (i.e. they genuinely desired to engage in the behavior), 
or it may be that the behavior reflects an external cause (i.e. the high-status 
person coerced them into the behavior) or some combination. In the second 
case, the scenario is reversed and a high-status person acts in accordance with 
the preferences of a low-status person. In this case only a cause internal to the 
actor is apparent because the person with lower status cannot coerce the high-
status individual. In fact, participants in the study rated the strength of an internal 
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cause as much weaker in the first scenario than in the second (Thibaut and 
Riecken 1955). This is consistent with the discounting principle because the 
observers reduced their attributions to an internal characteristic of the low-status 
person due to the presence of a potential external influence (the high-status 
person). 
To illustrate the augmentation principle, consider two closely related 
scenarios not tested by Thibaut and Riecken. In the first, a low-status person 
acts contrary to the preferences of a high-status person. In the second, a high-
status person acts contrary to the preferences of a low-status person. In the first 
scenario, people are likely to make a stronger attribution to a characteristic 
internal to the low-status person because the action was contrary to the potential 
external cause (coercion from the high-status individual). In the second scenario, 
the attribution to an internal characteristic will be weakened because there is no 
external cause inhibiting the high-status person. The stronger attribution in the 
first scenario is consistent with the augmentation principle. 
Another principle of attribution theory has been demonstrated by Ajzen 
(1971) and Eagly and Chaiken (1975). I will refer to it as the expectations 
principle. The expectations principle is a direct extension of the augmentation 
principle and can be expressed in two ways: First, the strength of an ex post 
causal attribution to internal characteristics of a person is a negative function of 
the a priori assessed probability of the event based primarily on knowledge of 
external causes (Ajzen 1971), and second, the strength of a causal attribution to 
external characteristics is a negative function of the a priori assessed probability 
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of the event based primarily on knowledge of the internal characteristics of the 
actor (Eagly and Chaiken 1975). 
In his experiment, Ajzen (1971) first tells participants about an actor's 
utility gains from a certain behavior. The participants are asked to give a 
probability that the actor will engage in the behavior. Participants are then told 
what action the actor took and are asked to rate the strength of the possible 
causes. Ajzen finds that the strength of attribution to personal characteristics as 
opposed to incentives is a negative function of the assessed probability of the 
action based on knowledge of the actor’s incentives. In other words, the less 
likely an action is judged a priori based on external causes, the stronger one's 
attribution to the actor’s personal characteristics ex post. Ajzen explains the 
result in terms of the information provided by the action. When an actor takes a 
highly probable action (based on the utility of that action) there is no new 
information in the action itself, only confirmation of expectations. When an actor 
takes an unexpected action, there appears to be new information for the 
observer in that action (Ajzen 1971). In order for participants to reconcile the 
unexpected action to the circumstances, the internal characteristics of the actor 
must be emphasized. Note that this is consistent with the augmentation principle 
formulated by Kelley (1973) in that incentives in this case acted as an inhibitory 
cause. 
Eagly and Chaiken’s (1975) experiment involved two groups of 
participants. The first group was exposed to a communicator, but not to the 
communicator’s message. This group rated the attractiveness of the 
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communicator and the likelihood that they would espouse a set of positions. The 
second group was exposed to the communicator and to the message containing 
one of the positions. They then rated the persuasiveness of the message. The 
theory espoused by Eagly and Chaiken is that the more unexpected the 
message, the more it would be rated as corresponding to underlying reality, and 
would thus be more persuasive. This is in fact what they found. When the 
message was not what participants expected a priori based on characteristics of 
the communicator, they attributed the message to an external cause, the 
correspondence with underlying facts and circumstances, ex post. 
Two simple examples will serve to illustrate the expectations principle. 
Assume the following scenario: Firm A always gives unqualified opinions to every 
financial statement they audit. Because Firm A has always given an unqualified 
opinion for every financial statement, the expectation is that they will similarly 
opine on the next set of financial statements they audit. However, if Firm A audits 
a set of financials and does not give an unqualified opinion, the most likely ex 
post explanation is that the financials are egregiously misstated; this is a strong 
attribution to an external factor. Now assume the following scenario: Everyone 
who has ever audited a certain set of financials has provided an unqualified 
opinion. The expectation is that when Firm A audits them it will also provide an 
unqualified opinion. If Firm A audits the financials and does not provide a clean 
opinion, the likely ex post explanation is that Firm A is either incompetent or is 
highly competent and identified a misstatement that other audits missed – both 
are strong attributions to a characteristic of Firm A. 
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Before developing the hypotheses, it is important to place attribution 
theory in the context of experiment one’s setting. My first experiment focuses on 
the judgments of financial statement users and how those judgments are affected 
by the audit disclosure. In this setting, financial statement users are asked to 
make causal attributions related to auditors, management, and financial reporting 
decisions. The person and entity from Kelley’s framework are the auditor and 
management’s reporting decision. The auditor’s agreement or disagreement with 
management’s reporting decision is a particular configuration of the auditor and 
management’s reporting decision. The event is the auditor’s unqualified (clean) 
opinion on the financial statements. 
I believe this scenario represents a hybrid of Kelley’s case one and case 
two scenarios as it has aspects of both. Users will be given an audit disclosure 
that discusses the auditor’s agreement with multiple management reporting 
decisions. In this respect, the user has access to multiple observations. However, 
the configuration of factors is also important in this setting, similar to a case two 
scenario. Specifically, there are power and relational dynamics between the 
auditor and management. For example, management may be able to coerce the 
auditor into providing a clean opinion (despite disagreement) under threat of 
firing the auditor. Similarly, the auditor may be able to coerce management into 
reporting a specified position under threat of a qualified or adverse opinion. Also, 
each of management’s reporting choices can be viewed as unique factors such 
that the same entity is not present in each of the multiple observations. This is in 
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contrast to Kelley’s descriptions of case one scenarios as multiple observations 
of the exact same entity and person combination. 
 
Attribution Theory Hypotheses 
This experiment focuses on how the judgments of financial statement 
users are affected by the content of an expanded audit disclosure. Financial 
statement users make causal attributions related to auditors, management, and 
financial reporting decisions that are reflected in users’ ratings of audit and 
reporting quality. Audit quality is determined in part by the auditor’s competence 
(ability to detect misstatements) and independence (willingness to appropriately 
alter the audit opinion in response to detected misstatements) (DeAngelo 1981). 
Consistent with the principle of covariation, users’ perceptions of auditor 
competence are not expected to vary, because the auditor is demonstrating the 
ability to detect misstatements equally in all cases (no variance in competence). 
However, users’ judgments of auditor independence are expected vary. 
The auditor and the financial statements are held constant. The event, the 
auditor’s unqualified opinion, is also held constant. Management’s specific 
reporting choices vary as does the auditor’s agreement with those choices 
(configuration). In accordance with the covariation principle, when the auditor 
both agrees with management’s reporting choices and provides a corresponding 
clean audit opinion, users are expected to attribute the audit opinion to the 
auditor’s agreement with management’s reporting choices. This is also consistent 
with the expectations principle in that users expect a clean opinion when the 
           48
 49 
 
auditor agrees with management’s reporting choices. However, when the auditor 
disagrees with management’s reporting choices, users would expect the auditor 
not to issue a clean opinion. The event of a clean opinion is unexpected for this 
configuration of factors, and in accordance with the expectations principle, users 
are expected to attribute the audit opinion to a property of the auditor – lack of 
independence. 
In this regard, the covariation and expectation principles suggest a 
positive relation between the auditor’s expressed level of agreement with 
management and users’ perceptions of auditor independence in the presence of 
an unqualified report. Figure 2 shows the constructs included in the model of 
experiment one. Going forward, each hypothesis described will add links to the 
model. H1 hypothesizes a positive relation between auditor agreement and 
users’ perceptions of auditor independence, given that a clean opinion is issued. 
H1: Users’ perception of auditor independence will decrease when the auditor 
disagrees with management. 
 
Figure 2 – Construct-Level Model with First Hypothesized Link6 
 
 
                                                            
6 The link between auditor agreement and perceptions of auditor independence is labeled as 
negative in Figure 2 due to the fact that auditor agreement is coded as 1= “agree” 2= “disagree”. 
‐ 
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Hypothesis one is counter-intuitive for many people with knowledge of 
auditing. Independence concerns are generally raised because stakeholders are 
worried that the auditor will incorrectly agree with management without the 
proper level of professional skepticism. However, by expanding required audit 
disclosures, regulators may be inadvertently creating a situation in which 
expressing disagreement with management causes the auditor to appear less 
independent to users by violating the expectations associated with an unqualified 
audit opinion. 
To understand the significance of H1, it is important to understand two 
facts about financial statement auditing: First it is possible to issue a clean 
opinion in spite of a disagreement with one or more of management’s reporting 
choices as long as the effects of the questioned reporting choices are not 
material individually, or in the aggregate. In this experiment, users are told that 
the auditor believes a clean opinion is warranted in light of the total audit 
evidence obtained. Second, independent auditors are to exhibit professional 
skepticism – that is they neither believe nor disbelieve management assertions 
without evidence (AU 220, AU 230). An independent auditor opines based on 
that evidence and should be otherwise uninfluenced by management. Standard 
setters such as the PCAOB and users are generally worried about a lack of 
independence when it leads the auditor to overreliance on, and agreement with, 
management (PCAOB 2011a). Intuitively, an auditor expressing disagreement 
with management would be viewed as demonstrating independence. In fact, 
archival research indicates that managers attempt to avoid any auditor reporting 
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that could be viewed in a negative light (e.g. (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002; 
Lennox 2005). However, due to the previously described expectations gap, users 
may not understand that a clean opinion can be rendered in light of 
disagreements causing a violation of users’ expectations. Thus, the auditor is 
likely to be judged ex post as less independent for an action that, a priori would 
typically be considered a demonstration of independence. 
High quality financial reporting should be free from bias (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 2010b). The experiment manipulates the 
consistency of management’s reporting choices with their financial incentives 
(consistent or inconsistent). The covariation principle suggests that when 
management repeatedly chooses to report consistently with incentives, users will 
attribute management’s reporting choice to management bias rather than 
properties of the underlying transaction (which does not vary with management’s 
reporting choice). On the other hand, when management repeatedly reports 
inconsistently with incentives, it is likely to be viewed by users as unexpected 
behavior. As discussed previously, the expectations principle (Ajzen 1971; Eagly 
and Chaiken 1975) shows that unexpected behavior is likely to be viewed as 
caused by external factors (properties of the underlying transaction) when 
expectations are based on internal characteristics of the actor (management 
bias). Thus, attribution theory suggests a negative relation between the incentive-
consistency of management’s reporting choices and users’ perception of 
management credibility, as expressed in hypothesis two. 
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H2: Users’ perception of management credibility will increase as the incentive-
consistency of management’s reporting choices decreases. 
 
Experiment One: Support Theory 
Support theory as postulated by Tversky and Koehler (1994) describes 
how people subjectively evaluate the probabilities of hypotheses. Specifically, 
when people are asked to judge the probability of two complementary 
hypotheses7, the estimates they give generally add to one (or reasonably close 
to one). However, studies find that 
Figure 3 – Construct-Level Model with Second Hypothesized Link 
 
 
when outcomes that are nested within one hypothesis are explicitly listed for 
participants, the probability they assign to each of the nested outcomes adds to 
more than the probability originally assigned to the parent hypothesis (Tversky 
and Koehler 1994). For example, Tversky and Koehler (1994) asked participants 
to assess the likelihood of two competing causes of death: death by a natural 
cause or death by an unnatural cause. On average, participants estimated the 
probabilities as 58% and 32%, respectively. However, when participants were 
                                                            
7 Complementary hypotheses are hypotheses that are mutually exclusive but together are 
descriptively exhaustive. For example, the probabilities that a football team wins or does not win a 
game are complementary because they are mutually exclusive and cover all potential outcomes. 
‐ 
‐ 
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asked to assess the probability of death due to heart disease, cancer, or other 
natural causes (causes all nested within natural causes) the mean assessed 
probabilities were 22%, 18%, and 33% respectively (sum=73%). The total 
assessed probability for death by natural causes changed from 58% to 73% 
when the hypothesis was “unpacked” into specific examples. The implication is 
that the probability of death by unnatural causes would also have to be reduced 
to prevent the total probability assigned to death from exceeding 1.0. Tversky 
and Koehler term this reduction in the complementary hypothesis “subadditivity” 
(1994). 
In explaining Support Theory, Tversky and Koehler (1994) propose that 
when people assess the probabilities of competing hypotheses, they do so using 
an availability or representativeness heuristic. In other words, the ease with 
which a person can think of examples consistent with a hypothesis increases the 
perceived support for the hypothesis and thus increases its judged probability. 
Unpacking a hypothesis into specific examples enhances the salience of those 
possibilities and may identify possibilities that people would not normally 
consider, thereby increasing total support for the hypothesis. Support theory is 
robust and has even been shown to hold in samples of experts working within 
their domain of expertise (Redelmeier et al. 1995). Therefore, it should hold for 
users evaluating audited financial statements. 
Tversky and Koehler measure the effects of support theory with an 
“unpacking factor” (1994). The unpacking factor is constructed as the total 
probability assigned to an unpacked hypothesis divided by the probability 
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assigned to its parent hypothesis. As an example, consider the unpacking factor 
for the death by natural causes hypothesis explained on page 51. The total 
unpacked probability of a natural cause of death is 73%. The probability originally 
assigned to the parent hypothesis is 58%. Dividing 73% by 58% yields the 
unpacking factor of 1.26. The unpacking factor used in experiment one is further 
described in the development of hypothesis four. 
 
Support Theory Hypotheses 
The audit disclosure’s effect on users’ perceptions of risk of material 
misstatement is important. Audits do not result in absolute assurance that the 
financial statements are free of material misstatements, but rather reasonable 
assurance (AU 110). Thus, even a clean audit opinion allows for a small 
probability that the financial statements are misstated. To the extent that users 
understand this, a clean audit report should result in users holding varying beliefs 
about the presence of misstatements in the financial statement8. At one end of 
the spectrum is an absolute belief that the financial statements are fairly 
presented; at the other is the absolute belief that the financial statements are 
misstated. These varying beliefs imply two complementary hypotheses (fair 
presentation or misstatement), each with an associated probability. 
Traditionally, the independent auditor’s report has not provided any 
additional support for one hypothesis or the other beyond the opinion paragraph 
                                                            
8 Verbal protocol analyses with professional analysts demonstrate that users look to the audit 
opinion for any indications of misstatement. Analysts looked for three cues: 1) Is the audit opinion 
present? 2) Is the opinion clean? 3) Is the opinion from a Big 4 auditor? (Coram et al. 2011). In 
the current audit environment, missing or modified opinions are considered indications of risk, 
including risk of misstatement. 
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(a simple pass fail audit report model). However, an audit disclosure expressing 
agreement (disagreement) with specific items in the financial statements can be 
viewed as “unpacking” instances of the fair presentation (misstatement) 
hypotheses. One of the tenets of support theory is that “judged probability 
increases by unpacking the focal hypothesis and decreases by unpacking the 
alternative hypothesis” (Tversky and Koehler 1994, p. 547). Manipulating the 
auditor’s agreement simultaneously manipulates the hypothesis being unpacked 
by the auditor’s statement – the focal hypothesis (misstatement) in the 
disagreement condition and the alternative hypothesis (fair presentation) in the 
agreement condition. For instance, when the auditor expresses disagreement 
with management’s warranty expense estimate, the auditor has unpacked one 
specific instance in which the financial statements are misstated, and the overall 
probability assigned to the misstatement hypothesis should increase. Thus, 
auditors and management could affect users’ perceptions of the financial 
statements by purposefully unpacking one hypothesis or the other. As a result, a 
number of closely related perceptions are expected to change as well, such as 
perceived accuracy, risk, and management and auditor competence. To the 
extent that users’ perceptions and investment decisions are affected by the 
content of the audit disclosure, expanding the audit disclosure could be said to 
achieve the regulators’ objective of increasing the relevance of the auditor’s 
report. 
 Support Theory suggests users’ perceptions of the likelihood of a material 
misstatement will change based on the content of the audit disclosure, despite an 
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unqualified audit opinion and equivalent financial reports. This results in the 
following hypothesis. 
H3: Users’ perceived risk of material misstatement will increase (decrease) when 
the auditor disagrees (agrees) with management’s reporting choices. 
 
Figure 4 – Construct-Level Model with Third Hypothesized Link 
  
Support theory also suggests that subadditivity will be present in the 
participants’ risk of material misstatement (RMM) assessments. Tversky and 
Koehler’s unpacking factor (1994) is used to detect and quantify subadditivity in 
responses. For this study, the unpacking factor is defined in terms of the 
misstatement hypothesis in equation 1: 
(1)  UFi = (RMM_Asseti + RMM_Liabilityi) / RMM_Overalli 
Where:  UFi = unpacking factor for participant i 
RMM_Asseti = participant i’s assessed risk of material 
misstatement in the asset account 
RMM_Liabilityi = participant i’s assessed risk of material 
misstatement in the liability account 
RMM_Overalli = participant i’s assessed risk of material 
misstatement anywhere in the financials 
Support theory indicates that the numerator of the ratio will increase 
(decrease) faster than the denominator as the misstatement (no misstatement) 
‐ 
‐
‐ 
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hypothesis is unpacked, and therefore, UF > 1 (UF<1) indicates subadditivity 
associated with the misstatement (no misstatement) hypothesis. This results in 
the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Auditor disagreement (agreement) creates subadditivity associated with the 
misstatement (no misstatement) hypothesis such that UFagree > UFcontrol > 
UFdisagree. 
 
Perceived Reporting Quality and Investment 
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Conceptual 
Framework, financial reports should have the qualitative characteristics of 
relevance and faithful representation. This study will focus on faithful 
representation in the construct of perceived reporting quality (RQ)9. Faithful 
representation means that the financial statements are complete, neutral, and 
free from error (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2010b). Completeness 
indicates that all material information required for understanding is included in the 
financial statements (FASB 2010a, QC13); neutral information is “without bias in 
the selection or presentation of financial information” (FASB 2010a, QC14); and 
“free from error” indicates that “there are no errors or omissions in the description 
of the phenomenon” (FASB 2010a, QC15). Perceived RMM in this context is an 
indication of the perceived likelihood that the financial statements are NOT “free 
from error.” The hypotheses from support theory (H3a and H3b) predict that the 
level of auditor agreement will only directly affect perceived RQ via the perceived 
RMM (i.e. “free from error” element of faithful representation). However, because 
                                                            
9 Questions addressing relevance, comparability, and understandability are included in the 
instrument following the main dependent variable measures. The instrument is intended to hold 
relevance, comparability, and understandability constant across conditions. 
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the full experimental model includes a number of indicator variables for all 
elements of perceived RQ, the statistical test of H3 is conducted in three stages 
to isolate auditor agreement’s affect on perceived RMM (see Section 5 for the 
detailed statistical analysis).  
Perceived management credibility and auditor independence should both 
have positive relations with perceived RQ because of their effect on neutrality as 
well as the auditor’s role in attesting to completeness and freedom from errors. 
Furthermore, empirical research results indicate that management credibility and 
auditor independence are both likely to affect perceptions of reporting quality. 
Mercer (2005) shows that, in the short-term, incentive inconsistent (“forthright”) 
reporting by management increases investors’ perceptions of management 
credibility (due to positive attributions) and that increased credibility increases 
reliance on management’s disclosures. Mercer’s finding that investors rely more 
on disclosures from credible managers supports the prediction that credibility 
positively affects perceptions of financial reporting quality. Gaynor et al. (2006) 
show that experienced audit committee members are willing to sacrifice audit 
quality to avoid public disclosures that might negatively affect perceived auditor 
independence, and Dopuch et al. (2003) demonstrate that perceived 
independence problems deflate market prices, even when those perceptions do 
not reflect actual independence impairments. The links hypothesized in H5a and 
H5b as well as H6 (explained below) are shown in Figure Five. 
 
H5a: Users’ perceived reporting quality will decrease as perceived management 
credibility decreases. 
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H5b: Users’ perceived reporting quality will decrease as perceived auditor 
independence decreases. 
 
One of the primary purposes of financial reporting is to reduce information 
risk about future cash flows so that users can make informed investment 
decisions (Financial Accounting Standards Board 2010a). As the perceived 
quality of that information deteriorates, users’ information risk increases. Barton 
and Mercer (2005) demonstrate that analysts reduce stock valuations when 
managers have a poor “reporting reputation”, which is analogous to poor 
perceived reporting quality in this experiment. Capital markets research shows 
that information risk cannot be negated completely through diversification and 
increases the cost of capital as a result (Easley et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005). 
Therefore, as perceived RQ decreases, users’ will demand a higher return on 
investment and willingness to invest (holding expected return constant) will 
decrease. 
 
H6: Users will invest less as their perceptions of reporting quality decrease. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Construct-Level Model with Sixth through Eighth Hypothesized 
Links 
 
  
  
 
‐ 
‐  +
+
‐ 
+
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Experiment Two: Theory and Hypothesis Development 
One of the changes under consideration by standard setters, particularly 
the Audit Practices Board (APB), is the disclosure of auditor’s materiality 
judgments (APB 2013; EC 2012; IAASB 2012; PCAOB 2011b). Auditors’ 
assessments of materiality have not been made public in the past, and it is 
unclear what effect doing so will have on investors’ judgments and decisions. 
Auditors’ definition of materiality refers to matters that are important to financial 
statement users (Louwers et al. 2011). Normatively, the concept of what is and is 
not material should flow from users of financial statements to the auditor (PCAOB 
2010a; SEC 1999). However, if auditors disclose their assessed level of 
materiality to users (either directly or indirectly), the users’ judgments of 
materiality are likely to be affected. The potential arises for auditors to manipulate 
perceptions of materiality through the expanded disclosures under consideration 
by the standard setters. On the other hand, investors have requested materiality 
disclosures in order to have a better framework for evaluating the work of the 
auditor and the resulting audit opinion (PCAOB 2011). The purpose of 
experiment two is to determine what effect materiality disclosures will have on 
investors’ materiality judgments and perceptions of audit quality. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) 
suggests that disclosure of the auditor’s materiality level will act as an anchor for 
investors’ materiality decisions when those decisions are made after exposure to 
the audit disclosure. In addition, even if the auditor’s materiality level is not 
explicitly stated, the dollar amounts of accounting items discussed by the auditor 
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in the audit disclosure may act as an anchor for materiality when users evaluate 
the financial statements because items of the amount discussed appear to be 
important to the auditor. Thus, an expanded audit report may affect users’ 
materiality assessments whether or not the auditor explicitly discloses his/her 
assessed level of materiality. However, if investors establish a materiality level 
prior to reading the auditor’s disclosure, they may be affected less by the 
disclosure. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic leads to the following hypotheses 
regarding the effects of materiality disclosures on investors’ materiality 
perceptions: 
H7: Users’ materiality judgments will be closer to the auditor’s when elicited after 
reviewing the audit disclosure than before. 
 
RQ1: Will users’ materiality judgments be affected by the audit disclosure when 
materiality is implied as opposed to explicitly stated in the disclosure? 
 
Figure 6 – H7 and RQ1 Depicted at the Construct Level 
 
There is reason to believe that the change in users’ materiality levels 
caused by the disclosure of the auditor’s materiality threshold will have additional 
measurable effects on users’ judgments and decisions. Users’ materiality 
thresholds can be viewed as an indication of the precision expected from the 
financial statements, and the auditor’s materiality threshold is viewed as an 
indication of the level of assurance provided (Mock et al. 2009). If users’ 
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expected levels of precision and the auditor’s level of assurance do not match, it 
seems likely that users would perceive audit quality as low for a number of 
reasons. For example, if a user’s materiality is $10,000 and the auditor reports a 
materiality threshold of $2,000,000, the user is likely to believe the auditor is not 
conducting an audit sufficient for the user’s needs. If the situation reverses such 
that the auditor’s materiality threshold is substantially lower than the users, the 
auditor is likely to appear inefficient, unrealistic, or overly conservative.  
Social psychology theory provides an additional explanation for the effect 
of a materiality match (mismatch) increasing (decreasing) perceptions of audit 
quality. According to Byrne’s model of interpersonal attraction and attitude 
similarity, a close match would trigger positive feelings of validation while a 
mismatch would trigger negative feelings (p.713 (Byrne 1961): 
“Anytime another person offers us validation by indicating that his 
percepts and concepts are congruent with ours, it constitutes a 
rewarding interaction, and hence, one element in forming a positive 
relationship. Any time that another person indicates dissimilarity 
between our two notions, it constitutes a punishing interaction and 
thus one element in forming a negative relationship.” 
 
 As users’ expected levels of precision and the level of assurance come 
closer together as predicted in H7, users’ perceptions of audit quality should 
increase because the auditor is matching performance expectations. Also, as the 
level of precision and the level of assurance provided converge, there should be 
a direct impact on the perceived RMM. I predict that users’ perceived RMM will 
be inversely related to perceived audit quality, and thus perceived audit quality is 
expected to partially mediate the relation between the materiality disclosure and 
users’ perceived RMM. 
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H8a: Users’ perceptions of audit quality will increase when users’ materiality is 
closer to the auditor’s materiality. 
 
H8b: Users’ perceived risk of material misstatement will decrease when users’ 
materiality is closer to the auditor’s materiality. 
 
Based on the logic that perceived investment risk increases with perceived 
RMM and decreases as perceived audit quality increases, I expect that users’ 
willingness to invest in the company will be inversely related to their perceived 
RMM. 
Figure 7 – Construct-Level Model with H8(a) and H8(b) Included 
 
 
 
H9: Users’ willingness to invest will increase when users’ materiality is closer to 
the auditor’s materiality. 
 
Figure 8 - Construct-Level Model with H9 Included 
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Jennings et al. (1991) show that judges decrease auditor liability 
assessments for known misstatements when the auditor’s materiality level is 
disclosed, indicating increased acceptance of the auditor’s materiality level. I 
expect users’ perceived audit quality to decrease in light of known misstatements 
(H10a). However, the effect of changes to users’ materiality levels on the 
decrease in perceived audit quality depends on the predominant direction of the 
changes. If users’ uninfluenced materiality levels tend to be below (above) that of 
auditors, the misstatement will appear material (immaterial), and thus more (less) 
severe; an audit disclosure will bring materiality judgments closer to the auditor’s 
level decreasing (increasing) the perceived severity of the misstatement (see 
Figure 9 on the following page). Therefore, users’ uninfluenced materiality 
judgments relative to auditor materiality in the case will determine whether audit 
quality is judged to be higher or lower given a known misstatement, and, as a 
result, H10b is stated in the null form. 
H10a: Users’ perceptions of audit quality will decrease after exposure to known 
misstatements. 
 
H10b: The distance between users’ and auditors’ materiality will have no effect 
on users’ perceptions of audit quality after exposure to known misstatements. 
 
The perceived severity of the misstatement and perceived audit quality 
after exposure to the misstatement are expected to influence users’ investment 
choice and willingness to hold the auditor liable for the misstatement  
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Figure 9 – The Sign-Dependent Effects of User Materiality Changes 
 
Figure 10 – Construct-Level Depiction of H10a and H10b 
 
 
(Kadous 2000). However, because the directional effect of anchoring on users’ 
perceived audit quality after exposure to a misstatement is unknown I cannot 
make a directional prediction for the effect of anchoring on users’ judgments of 
auditor liability. Furthermore, research shows that perceptions of audit quality do 
not affect liability judgments in the presence of severe misstatements, but do in 
the presence of more moderate misstatements (Kadous 2000). Therefore, users’ 
liability judgments are addressed with a research question. 
 
RQ2: Will the auditor’s materiality disclosure affect users’ liability judgments for 
known misstatements below materiality? 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
Experiment One: Participants 
Experiment one and two use non-professional investors (experiment two) 
or proxies for non-professional investors (experiment one). There are two primary 
reasons for using MBA students as opposed to professional investors, analysts, 
or students. First, conceptually, materiality is defined in terms of a reasonable 
investor. As Hicks (1964) notes, the reasonable investor is likely a lower 
threshold of knowledge and sophistication than would be encountered in 
professional investors or analysts. Also, some of the predictions from attribution 
theory rely on users having an expectation of typical management incentives and 
behavior. Non-professional investors are likely to have developed these 
expectations. Second, from a practical standpoint, non-professional investors are 
more readily available than professional investors or analysts. 
In experiment one MBA students from a major land-grant university proxy 
for non-professional investors. Elliot et al. (2007) find that MBA students can be 
good proxies for non-professional investors in tasks that do not involve a high 
degree of integrative complexity. The tasks in this study are not high in 
integrative complexity. Also, the predictions from attribution theory rely on users 
having an expectation of typical management incentives and behavior. The 
students’ accounting coursework –which includes the topic of earnings 
management – provides them with the background to develop these 
expectations. 
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Participants were recruited mid-way through the financial accounting 
module of a full-time MBA program at a major land-grant university. 80 
participants took part in the study resulting in 73 usable responses; seven 
participants failed at least one comprehension or manipulation check and are not 
considered in the remaining analysis. Participant demographics are reported in 
Table 1. Out of the 73 usable responses, nine were from participants with a 
background in accounting or finance (defined as having an undergraduate major 
of accounting, finance, or financial management or a career in accounting or 
finance). The participants ranged in age from 20 to 31 years old, with a mean of 
24 years. They reported having a mean (median) of 2.76 (2.00) accounting 
courses. The participants provided the approximate value of their equity holdings 
as of June 30, 2012 (15 days prior to the experiment) by selecting either zero, or 
one of five ranges representing investment values of $1 to more than $100,000. 
The full range of available responses is represented in the sample. Using the 
lowest number in each response range, the mean value of equity holdings 
among the participants is $9,316. The mean value increases to $14,590 using 
the midpoint of the response ranges. This suggests that the participants have 
experience managing small equity portfolios. 
I tested mean differences among conditions for the demographic variables 
age, lower bound of equity holdings, midpoint of equity holdings, and number of 
accounting courses. None of these demographic variables differed significantly 
among conditions at the 0.05 level. Number of accounting courses was 
marginally significant (p=0.06). Further investigation showed that there was a 
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significant difference in the number of accounting classes between participants in 
the agreement, incentive consistent condition and those in the disagreement, 
incentive inconsistent condition. However, a MANCOVA including the number of 
accounting classes as a covariate indicates that the number of accounting 
classes does not significantly affect any of the dependent variables of interest (p 
values between 0.181 and 0.951). 
Experience with financial statements and the auditor’s report (number of 
financial statements reviewed in an average month, frequency of reviewing the 
financial statements before making an investment, and the frequency of 
reviewing the auditor’s report before making an investment) does not significantly 
differ among conditions. 
Experiment One: Method 
The purpose of experiment one is to determine the incremental effect of 
audit disclosure content10 after controlling for differences in the financial strength 
of companies and the presence of an unqualified opinion. This experiment 
focuses on audit disclosures related to management’s accounting estimates for 
valuing assets and liabilities for several reasons. Both the PCAOB and IAASB 
indicate that users desire the auditor’s views on management’s estimates, and 
both boards are considering requiring such disclosure either directly to investors 
                                                            
10 The PCAOB Concept Release (2011b) provides an example AD&A with multiple sections 
covering a variety of topics. This study is only intended to investigate the portion of audit 
disclosures dealing with disagreements with management and the discussion of significant 
estimates. 
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Table 1 – Experiment 1 Participant Variables 
Panel A – Demographic Variables by Condition 
Cell Age Equity Low-Point 
Equity 
Mid-Point Classes
Control 
N 34      34    34  33
Mean 24.03    10,295   15,883  2.58
Median 23.00      1   5,001  2.00
Std. Dev. 2.67    23,930   24,073  2.87
Agree, 
Inconsistent 
N 30      30     30  29
Mean 24.20    12,001   17,334  4.17
Median 23.00      1   5,001  2.00
Std. Dev. 2.63    26,182   27,378  4.38
Agree, 
Consistent 
N 27      27     27  27
Mean 23.33    8,890   13,890  2.67
Median 23.00      1   5,001  3.00
Std. Dev. 2.09    20,817   22,159  2.00
Disagree, 
Inconsistent 
N 26      26     26  26
Mean 24.15    8,462   12,885  2.42
Median 23.00      1   5,001  1.00
Std. Dev. 3.31    19,939   20,889  3.16
Disagree, 
Consistent 
N 29      29     29  29
Mean 23.55    6,552   12,414  1.97
Median 23.00      1   5,001  1.00
Std. Dev. 2.21    13,700   20,205  2.01
Total 
N 73      73     73  72
Mean 23.86    9,316   14,590  2.76
Median 23.00      1   5,001  2.00
Std. Dev. 2.60    21,291   22,966  3.07
Age = Age in years. 
Equity Low-Point = The lower bound of the participant selected range of equity 
holdings at June 30, 2012. 
Equity Mid-Point = The midpoint of the participant selected range of equity 
holdings at June 30, 2012. 
Classes = The number of accounting courses completed. 
Cell – Explained below. 
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Panel B – Experience Using Financial Statements by Condition 
Cell 
Financial 
Statements
Financial 
Frequency 
Audit 
Report 
Frequency
Control 
N 34 33 30
Mean 1.03 4.42 3.07
Median .50 4.00 3.00
Std. Dev. 1.40 1.68 2.05
Agree, 
Inconsistent 
N 30 29 27
Mean 2.37 4.69 3.37
Median 1.00 5.00 3.00
Std. Dev. 4.16 1.97 1.98
Agree, 
Consistent 
N 27 25 26
Mean 1.93 4.80 3.69
Median 1.00 5.00 3.50
Std. Dev. 3.01 1.94 2.02
Disagree, 
Inconsistent 
N 26 26 25
Mean 2.65 4.23 3.08
Median 1.00 4.50 3.00
Std. Dev. 5.04 1.84 1.87
Disagree, 
Consistent 
N 29 29 26
Mean .52 4.14 3.23
Median .00 4.00 3.00
Std. Dev. 1.02 2.28 2.03
Total 
N 73 71 67
Mean 1.66 4.45 3.28
Median 1.00 5.00 3.00
Std. Dev. 3.28 1.93 1.98
Financial Statements = the number of financial statements the 
participant reviews in an average month. 
Financial Frequency = The frequency with which the participant 
refers to financial statements when making an investment decision 
reported on a 7-point scale where 1 = "never" and 7 = "always". 
Audit Report Frequency = The frequency with which the participant 
refers to the auditor's report when making investment decisions 
reported on a 7-point scale where 1 = "never" and 7 = "always". 
Cell – Explained below. 
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(PCAOB 2011b, 2011d; IAASB 2011) or through communication to the audit 
committee (PCAOB 2011c). The auditor’s views regarding management 
estimates are specifically considered for inclusion in an AD&A in the PCAOB’s 
original concept release (2011a, 13) (emphasis added):  
“It also could include a discussion of the auditor's views regarding 
the company's financial statements, such as management's 
judgments and estimates, accounting policies and practices, and 
difficult or contentious issues, including ‘close calls.’” 
Similarly, the IAASB considered the following for disclosure (2011, 9) (emphasis 
added): 
1) “The auditor’s perspective on key assumptions underlying the 
judgments that materially affect the financial statements, and 
whether those assumptions are at the low, most likely, or high 
end of the range of possible outcomes.” 
2) “The methods and the judgments made in valuing assets and 
liabilities.” 
Furthermore, the IAASB’s example audit report includes a paragraph on 
management estimates (2012). During a meeting of the PCAOB’s Standing 
Advisory Group, Carcello et al. (2011) presented the results of an Investor 
Advisory Group survey of large, professional investors showing that 79 percent of 
respondents believe the auditor should discuss management’s significant 
estimates and judgments, the auditor’s assessment of their accuracy, and the 
basis for that assessment. It was the single most sought after disclosure in the 
survey. 
This study uses a within and between subjects 2x2+1 design in which the 
participants evaluate financially equivalent companies in pairs. For each pair of 
companies, participants review background information highlighting 
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management’s reporting incentives, financial statements, a brief description of 
the make-up and role of an audit committee, and a communication from the 
auditor to the audit committee regarding two of management’s key estimates 
(referred to as the audit disclosure). The auditor’s agreement with management 
on these two accounting issues is manipulated at two levels (agreement on both 
items or disagreement on both items), and the consistency with management 
incentives is manipulated at two levels (consistent and inconsistent). The 
experiment includes a control group in which the participants are presented with 
a basic audit disclosure that describes the presence of two management 
estimates but does not include details of the auditor or management’s position. 
The two accounting matters discussed in the audit disclosure are an 
estimate of warranty expense and an estimate of fair value for an investment 
asset. Both items are subject to a range of possible estimates. In the auditor 
agreement condition, the value reported by management falls inside the auditor’s 
range. To manipulate consistency with management incentives, the reported 
value is near the high or low end of the auditor’s range. In the auditor 
disagreement condition, the value reported by management falls outside of the 
range determined by the auditor. For example, in the agreement, incentive 
inconsistent condition, warranty expense is reported in the financial statements 
as $975,000. The acceptable range determined by the auditor and presented in 
the audit disclosure is between $700,000 and $1,000,000. Thus, the amount is 
within the auditor’s range and is inconsistent with management’s incentives for 
higher net income (net income decreases as warranty expense increases). In all 
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cases (other than the control condition), the audit disclosure provides the range 
for the estimate that the auditor believes is appropriate and management’s 
reported value. In the disagreement (agreement) conditions, the auditor explicitly 
states that management’s reported value is outside (inside) of the preferred 
range and whether the amount is closer to the high or low end. 
After reviewing the financial statements–but before reviewing the audit 
disclosure–participants provide a preliminary likelihood of material misstatement 
for the overall financial statements. After reading the audit disclosure, 
participants assess auditor independence (seven questions), management 
credibility (five questions), and financial reporting quality (nine questions, four for 
RMM and five for other aspects of RQ), (all on 7-point scales) and the probability 
of a material misstatement (0 -100 percent) for three areas (asset valuation, 
warranty expense, and overall). Factor analysis shows that all measurement 
items load on their intended factors (p < 0.05 for all items, factor loadings not 
tabulated). Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.799 or higher for each factor (Table 2). Next, 
participants allocate a $50,000 investment between the two companies. Finally, 
participants respond to a series of demographic questions and questions related 
to their experience using financial statements and auditors’ reports. 
Table 2 – Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the Four Perception Factors 
Factor Items Cronbach's Alpha 
    Raw Standardized 
Independence 7 0.839 0.842 
Credibility 5 0.799 0.803 
Reporting Quality 5 0.874 0.880 
Risk of Material Misstatement 4 0.949 0.949 
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After reading the background information for the case, participants answer 
a comprehension check to determine whether or not they understand 
management’s incentives. Any participants who fail the manipulation check are 
given a chance to review the pertinent information and attempt to answer the 
question again. A similar comprehension check is utilized after the audit 
disclosure to ensure that participants understand whether management’s 
recorded number falls within the auditor’s acceptable range. The complete 
instrument is included in Appendix B. 
 
Experiment Two: Participants 
Participants are 12111 non-professional investors in the United States 
recruited using Toluna, an on online survey company. Users voluntarily sign-up 
for survey invitations from Toluna in order to earn points that can be exchanged 
for various rewards. Each survey completed pays participants a varying number 
of points depending on the time required to complete the survey and the difficulty 
of procuring responses from a particular target population. Third parties contract 
with Toluna to distribute online surveys to targeted portions of the Toluna user 
base. The party contracting with Toluna can specify the characteristics of the 
population they are targeting. Toluna then bases the survey invitations on user 
demographics collected at the time users sign-up for Toluna. While the survey 
invitations are sent based on user demographics previously obtained, additional, 
specific screening questions can be included in a survey. In exchange for 
                                                            
11 A total of 127 responses were received. Two incomplete responses were removed. Four 
responses were removed as outliers. 
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payment from the contracting party, Toluna guarantees a certain number of valid 
responses to the survey and handles reimbursement of the participants via the 
point system. Toluna claims over 4 million users worldwide. 
For experiment two, invitations to the online instrument were sent to 
Toluna’s U.S. investor panel via e-mail. Respondents who engage in fewer than 
five individual stock transactions per year (not including mutual fund transactions) 
or who engage in stock transactions as part of their job description were 
screened out. Participant demographics are tabulated in Table 3. 
Participants appear to be experienced investors, as intended. The mean 
age is 48, their mean equity holdings are $20,000 - $49,999, and they engage in 
a mean of 78.8 equity transactions per year representing a mean annual 
investment of $10,000 - $19,999. Participants are also experienced using 
financial statements and the auditor’s report. The mean number of financial 
statements referenced per month is 5.5 (66 per year). Participants use the 
financial statements before making an investment “most of the time” and 
“sometimes” reference the auditor’s report (mean of 65 and 58, respectively, on a 
100-point scale with five labels ranging from “Never” at 0 to “Always” at 100). 
There were no significant differences in demographics among the four conditions 
(p-values ranging from 0.15 to 0.94, means are not tabulated). Participants took 
a mean of ten minutes to complete the instrument. 
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Table 3 – Experiment 2 Participant Demographics 
 Variable N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Age 116 48 15.331 
Equity Holdings 119 $20,000 – $49,999 N/A 
Equity Transactions per Year 121 78.8 106.808 
Annual Equity Investment 119 $10,000 – $19,999 N/A 
Financial Statements Referenced 
(per Month) 118 5.5 12.360 
Reference the Financial Statements 
Prior to Investing 121
65 – “Most of the 
Time” 
 
27.166 
Reference the Auditor’s Report Prior 
to Investing 118 58 – “Sometimes” 28.552 
Accounting Courses 119 3 3.644 
 
Experiment Two: Method 
The study uses a 2x2 between participants design where the order in 
which participants’ materiality judgments are elicited is manipulated at two levels 
(before or after reviewing the audit disclosure) and the explicitness of the 
auditor’s materiality level is manipulated at two levels (explicitly stated or implied 
in the audit disclosure). Participants are randomly assigned to one of the four 
cells by the survey software. In all cells, the participants receive a definition of 
materiality based on auditing standards in the first paragraph of the audit 
disclosure. 
The instrument captures a number of dependent and control variables. 
Participants answer three questions assessing their specific, quantitative 
materiality judgment either before or after the disclosure. In addition, they judge 
the risk of material misstatement and make an investment allocation in the 
company. They also answer three, seven-point Likert-scale questions assessing 
audit quality. Factor analysis shows that all audit quality measurement items load 
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on the intended factor (p < 0.001 for all items, specific factor loadings not 
tabulated). In addition, Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.924 (Table 4). 
Table 4 – Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Audit Quality 
Factor Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Raw Standardized
Audit Quality – Pre-Misstatement 3 0.924 0.926 
Audit Quality – Post-Misstatement 4 0.939 0.939 
 
Following Jennings et al. (1991), subjects are presented with a 
subsequently discovered misstatement below the auditor’s materiality threshold. 
A paragraph describing the misstatement, which was known to the auditor (but 
that is below the auditor’s disclosed materiality) is included in all conditions after 
the initial measurements of materiality, perceived audit quality, risk of material 
misstatement, etc. Users’ perceived audit quality is measured again after 
exposure to the misstatement. Additionally, the perceived severity of the 
misstatement is measured, users are given the option to reallocate their 
investment, and users’ judgment of the auditor’s liability for the misstatement is 
measured. The complete instrument is included in Appendix ?. 
Before beginning the statistical hypothesis tests for experiment two, it is 
important to define the terminology used hereafter. Recall that the study 
manipulates the order in which materiality is elicited (before or after the auditor’s 
disclosures) and the explicitness used in the disclosures (explicit or implicit). 
Accordingly, the four resulting cells are “after-explicit” (AE), “after-implicit” (AI), 
“before-explicit” (BE), and “before-implicit” (BI). At times it is also necessary to 
compare cells solely on the order of elicitation variable, resulting in the combined 
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compare cells solely on the order of elicitation variable, resulting in the combined 
groups “after” (Ax) and “before” (Bx). Furthermore, to test H7 and RQ1, I 
calculate a variable (Distance) representing the distance of the participants’ raw 
materiality responses from the given auditor’s materiality ($300,000) and the 
misstatement in the case, as defined in Equations two and three. 
2) Distance = |Participant Materiality – $300,000| 
3) DistanceToMis = Participant Materiality – $250,000 
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Chapter 5: Statistical Analysis 
Experiment One 
Experiment One: Control Variables 
 Recall from Chapter 3, page 52 that relevance, comparability, and 
understandability are all aspects of quality financial reporting. The instrument in 
experiment one is intended to hold the comparability and understandability of the 
financial statements constant among the conditions. The instrument includes 
questions addressing the comparability and understandability of both the 
financial statements, and ANOVAs show that users did not perceive a difference 
among financial statements on these two variables (see Table 5). 
Table 5 - ANOVA for User Ratings of Financial Statement Understandability 
and Comparability by Cell 
Variable Source Sum of 
Squares df
Mean 
Square F p
  Between Groups 4.849 4 1.212 0.748 0.561
Understandability  Within Groups 228.658 141 1.622 
  Total 233.507 145   
Comparability 
 Between Groups 4.849 4 1.682 0.769 0.547
 Within Groups 228.658 141 2.186 
 Total 233.507 145       
 
On the other hand, regulators’ stated intention is to increase the relevance 
and understandability of the audit report, while auditors suggest that expanding 
auditor reports will decrease comparability among the reports (PCAOB 2011d). 
ANOVAs show that the audit disclosures in at least one of the five cells differ on 
relevance, understandability, and comparability (Table 6). Analyses of group 
differences using both Tukey and Scheffe methods show that the control 
condition is significantly different than the four experimental conditions for all 
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three factors (Table 7). Specifically, users find the control condition disclosure 
significantly less useful for their investment decisions than the experimental 
conditions. However, despite their increased usefulness, users find the 
experimental conditions more difficult to understand than the control condition. 
This makes sense because the control condition is shorter and provides less 
specific information to the user. Finally, in accordance with auditors’ objections, 
users find that audit disclosures are more comparable between companies in the 
control condition. This makes sense because the disclosures are identical 
between companies in the control condition. Overall, the expanded audit 
disclosures appear to trade losses in understandability and comparability for 
increased usefulness in the investment decision process. 
Table 6 – ANOVA for Mean User Ratings of Disclosure Usefulness, 
Understandability, and Comparability by Cell 
Variable Source Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig.
Usefulness of 
Disclosures 
Between Groups 22.679 4 5.670 6.510 0.000
Within Groups 116.702 134 .871     
Total 139.381 138       
Understandability 
of Disclosures 
Between Groups 39.738 4 9.934 5.601 0.000
Within Groups 250.105 141 1.774     
Total 289.842 145       
Comparability of 
Disclosures 
Between Groups 20.263 4 5.066 2.259 0.066
Within Groups 311.737 139 2.243     
Total 332.000 143       
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Table 7 – Analysis of Homogenous Subsets 
Panel A – Disclosure Usefulness 
Correction 
Method Consistency
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 Agreement 
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 
1 2 1 2 
Tukey HSD 
Control 3.17   Control 3.17   
Inconsistent   3.96 Disagree   4.06
Consistent   4.22 Agree   4.13
p-value 1.00 0.40 p-value  1.000 0.93
Scheffe 
Control 3.17   Control 3.17   
Inconsistent   3.96 Disagree   4.06
Consistent   4.22 Agree   4.13
p-value 1.00 0.44 p-value  1.000 0.94
Panel B – Disclosure Understandability 
Correction 
Method Consistency
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 
Agreement 
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 
1 2 1 2 
Tukey HSD 
Inconsistent 2.61   Agree 2.74   
Consistent 3.05  Disagree 2.93  
Control   3.94 Control   3.94
p-value 0.24 1.000 p-value  0.77 1.00
Scheffe 
Inconsistent 2.61   Agree 2.74   
Consistent 3.05  Disagree 2.93  
Control   3.94 Control   3.94
p-value 0.28 1.000 p-value  0.79 1.00
Panel C – Disclosure Comparability 
Correction 
Method Consistency
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 Agreement 
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05* 
1 2 1 2 
Tukey HSD 
Inconsistent 3.00   Control 3.15   
Consistent 3.31 3.31 Disagree 3.16  
Control   3.91 Agree   3.91
p-value 0.59 0.135 p-value 0.99 1.00
Scheffe 
Inconsistent 3.00   Control 3.15   
Consistent 3.31 3.31 Disagree 3.16  
Control  3.91 Agree   3.91
p-value 0.62 0.16 p-value 0.99 1.00
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Experiment One: Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis one is tested using a simple ANOVA with auditor agreement 
(coded as 1 = agreement, 2 = control, 3 = disagreement) as the independent 
factor and the mean of the seven perceived auditor independence measures as 
the dependent variable. Hypothesis one predicts that when auditors express 
agreement (disagreement) with management’s reporting choices, users will view 
the auditor as more (less) independent. The ANOVA (Table 8) shows that auditor 
agreement significantly affects users’ perceptions of auditor independence 
(F(2,143) = 10.033, p < 0.001). Analyses of the cell means using Tukey and 
Scheffe methods of alpha-error correction both indicate that agreement has a 
significantly higher mean than the control and disagreement conditions. 
However, the means of the control and disagreement conditions do not differ. 
Agreement positively affects perceptions of independence, and this result is 
confirmed using structural equation modeling (SEM) in the analysis of the 
subsequent hypotheses (H3, H5, and H6). 
Table 8 – ANOVA Results for Perceived Independence 
Panel A – Cell Means 
Cell N Mean 
Agree 57 4.97 
Control 34 4.21 
Disagree 55 4.24 
 
Panel B – Simple ANOVA Results 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 19.115 2 9.557 10.033 0.000
Within Groups 136.219 143 0.953     
Total 155.334 145       
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Panel C – Homogenous Subsets 
  
Agreement N 
Subset for 
alpha = 0.05 
  1 2 
Tukey HSD 
Control 34 4.2086   
Disagree 55 4.2403   
Agree 57   4.9695 
Sig.   0.987 1.000 
Scheffe 
Control 34 4.2086   
Disagree 55 4.2403   
Agree 57   4.9695 
Sig.   0.988 1.000 
 
Experiment One: Hypothesis Two 
Hypothesis two predicts that when management reports consistently 
(inconsistently) with incentives, users will perceive management as less (more) 
credible. Hypothesis two is tested using a simple ANOVA with incentive 
consistency (coded as 1 = consistent, 2 = control, 3 = inconsistent) as the 
independent factor and the mean of the five perceived management credibility 
measures as the dependent variable. The ANOVA (Table 9, Panel B) shows that 
incentive consistency does not significantly affects users’ perceptions of 
management credibility (F(2,143)= 2.041, p = 0.134). However, a planned contrast 
(coefficients of 1, 0, -1) shows that the order is as predicted (t(143) = -2.020, p = 
0.045) (Table 9, Panel C), and a follow-up simple ANOVA (Table 9, Panel D) 
conducted without the control group shows that perceived credibility is lower 
(higher) when management’s reporting choice is consistent (inconsistent) with 
incentives (F(1,110) = 3.892, p = 0.051). Finally, a Jonckheere-Terpstra test for 
order shows that credibility is highest in the inconsistent cell, followed by the 
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control and consistent cells, as expected. I interpret the results as support for H2. 
See further discussion in Chapter 6. 
Table 9 – ANOVA Results for Perceived Credibility 
Panel A – Cell Means 
Cell N Mean 
Inconsistent 56 4.57 
Control 34 4.39 
Consistent 56 4.20 
 
Panel B – Simple ANOVA Results 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Between Groups 3.771 2 1.886 2.041 0.134
Within Groups 132.131 143 .924     
Total 135.902 145       
 
Panel C – Planned Contrast Results 
Contrast Coefficients Contrast Results 
Inconsistent Control Consistent Value Std. Error t df p 
-1 0 1 -0.367 0.182 -2.020 143 0.045
 
Panel D – ANOVA Results for Perceived Credibility (Control Group 
Removed) 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F p 
Between Groups 3.771 1 3.771 3.892 0.051 
Within Groups 106.581 110 0.969     
Total 110.351 111       
 
Panel E – Jonckheere-Terpstra Test Results 
Number of Cells 3 
N 146 
Observed J-T Statistic 2,910 
Mean J-T Statistic 3,472 
Std. Deviation of J-T Statistic 275.428 
Std. J-T Statistic (2.0405) 
p (2-tailed) 0.041 
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Experiment One: SEM Model Development 
 Hypotheses three, five, and six will be tested using SEM. Before doing so, 
it is important to test the factorial validity of the model that the subsequent SEM 
will be based upon (Byrne 2010). The model consists of the four perception 
factors identified in Chapter 4, Table 2, perceived auditor independence, 
management credibility, financial reporting quality, and risk of material 
misstatement. Figure 11 shows the model to be tested12. 
Figure 11 – Full SEM Factorial Model 
 
                                                            
12 The four factors, perceived auditor independence, management credibility, reporting quality, 
and risk of material misstatement are correlated as factors of the overall construct of user 
perceptions of financial reporting.  The purpose of this stage of the analysis is to find a theoretical 
model that fits the observed data well before examining the causal relations among the 
independent variables, perceptions of financial reporting, and user decisions during the 
hypothesis testing that follows. 
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 The results of the first analysis show that the model fit is questionable 
based on typical benchmarks for fit statistics. (χ2(183) = 450.320, p < 0.001, CFI = 
0.867, RMSEA = 0.100). Typically, the χ2 should be insignificant, though it is very 
sensitive to sample size and should be supplemented with additional fit statistics; 
CFI should be at least 0.9; the RMSEA should be no larger than 0.10, and 
preferably less than or equal to 0.06 (Byrne 2010). Examining the standardized 
residual covariance matrix shows eight values (of 210 total) greater than 2.00, all 
but one of which are associated with one measure of perceived independence 
(labeled Ind3) and one measure of perceived reporting quality (labeled RQ5). 
Inspection of the modification indices (Table 10) indicate that the error term 
associated with RQ5 (labeled E17) should be correlated with the error terms for 
two indicators, one associated with credibility (error term E12 associated with 
Cred5) and one associated with independence (error term E7 associated with 
Ind7). There is no theoretical reason why E17 should be correlated with E12 and 
E7,therefore the errors will not be correlated in the model (Byrne 2010). Due to 
the fact that RQ5 has problems indicated by both the standardized residual 
covariance and the modification indices, it will be removed. The updated model is 
shown in Figure 12. 
Table 10 – Partial List of Modification Indices for the SEM Factorial Model 
Item1   Item2 M.I. Par Change 
E12 <--> E17 57.215 0.768
E7 <--> E17 33.085 0.676
E6 <--> E3 29.301 0.610
E7 <--> E12 28.001 0.538
E19 <--> E18 11.808 51.267
E3 <--> E2 11.428 -0.398
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Figure 12 – Modified SEM Factorial Model 
 
 The fit statistics for the modified model improve over the original model, 
but remain marginal (χ2(164) = 355.658, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.898, RMSEA = 0.090). 
The new standardized residual covariance matrix still shows eight standardized 
residual covariances (of 190 total) larger than 2.00. However, six of the eight are 
associated with Ind3, indicating that this observed variable may be problematic. 
Inspecting the modification indices shows that the top modification is associated 
with the error term (E3) on Ind3. The modification index suggests that E3 should 
be correlated with the error term (E6) on another independence variable (Ind6). 
           87
 88 
 
The questions that comprise Ind3 and Ind6 are very similar13, so it seems 
appropriate that their errors should be correlated. However, rather than correlate 
the errors in the model, I have decided to remove Ind3 because of its redundancy 
with Ind6 and its problematic standardized residual covariances. The new model 
is depicted in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 - Modified SEM Factorial Model #2 
 
This model fits the data adequately, although the chi-square statistic is still 
significant, and although below 0.10, the RMSEA is still higher than the more 
widely accepted cutoff of 0.06 (Byrne 2010) (χ2(146) = 296.241, p < 0.001, CFI = 
                                                            
13 Ind3 reads “Other auditors would reach a different opinion about Company A’s financial 
statements.” Ind6 reads “Other auditors would reach the same opinion about Company A’s 
financial statements.” 
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0.916, RMSEA = 0.084). An investigation of the standardized residual covariance 
matrix now shows just three (of 171 total) residual covariances larger than 2.0, 
and only one larger than the 2.58 cutoff suggested by Byrne (2010). Inspection of 
the modification indices (Table 11) shows a number of error terms that should 
Table 11 – Partial List of Modification Indices for the Modified SEM 
Factorial Model #2 
Item1  Item2 M.I. Par Change 
E12 <--> E7 29.551 0.564 
E13 <--> RMM 11.974 -4.865 
E19 <--> E18 11.754 51.11 
E21 <--> E18 9.593 -54.888 
E19 <--> E16 9.362 -3.216 
E21 <--> Mgt Cred 8.395 2.373 
E14 <--> E13 8.096 0.115 
 
be correlated, but only five of the correlations make theoretical sense. The 
largest modification index indicates that the error term (E7) on Ind7 and the error 
term (E12) on Cred5 are correlated. This makes sense because both questions 
are framed as a direct comparison between Company A and Company B14, and 
to the extent the participant has chosen one company as the “better company,” it 
is likely reflected in both direct comparisons. Two of the remaining four 
theoretically valid modification indices suggest that the error term (E18) 
associated with RMM2 covaries with the error terms (E19 and E21) associated 
with RMM3 and RMM5. This makes theoretical sense because the questions are 
                                                            
14 Ind7 reads “Auditor A is more independent than Auditor B.” Cred5 reads “Company A’s 
management is more credible than Company B’s management.” 
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nested15. Therefore, the errors are correlated in the final model. The modification 
indices also suggest the error terms (E13 and E14) on RQ1 and RQ2 are 
correlated16. RQ1 measures accuracy, a precursor for reliability, which is 
measured by RQ2, and due to this theoretical relation, it seems reasonable for 
the error terms to be correlated. Finally, the modification indices suggest the 
error terms (E16 and E19) on RMM3 and RQ4 are correlated. Once again, due to 
the theoretical relation between the questions, it appears reasonable that the 
error terms are correlated. Figure 14 depicts the final model. 
The final model fits the data well (χ2(141) = 211.508, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.961, 
RMSEA = 0.059). There are only two standardized residual covariances (of 153 
total) greater than 2.00 and neither are larger than the 2.58 cutoff suggested by 
Byrne (2010). 
Experiment One: Hypothesis Three 
Hypothesis three states that auditor agreement will have an inverse 
relation with perceived RMM. Furthermore, theory suggests that this may be the 
only direct affect of auditor agreement on the larger construct of perceived RQ. 
The statistical test for hypothesis three is conducted in three stages. First, an 
SEM model is estimated with perceived RQ measured using only the RMM 
indicators from the model in Figure 14, (see Figure 15, Panel A). In this case, the 
  
                                                            
15 RMM2 reads “In your opinion, what is the likelihood… that the company’s financials contain a 
misstatement that you would consider important?” RMM3 reads “In your opinion, what is the 
likelihood… that the company’s financial statements contain a misstatement… anywhere in the 
financials?” RMM5 reads “In your opinion, what is the likelihood… that the company’s financial 
statements contain a misstatement… in the warranty estimate?” 
16 RQ1 reads “The company’s financial statements accurately represent their performance.” RQ2 
reads “The company’s financial statements are reliable.” 
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Figure 14 – Final SEM Factorial Model 
 
direct link from auditor agreement to perceived RQ is expected to be significant 
and negative,17 which is supported by the results (standardized path coefficient = 
-0.273, Z = -2.862, p = 0.004). The model fits the data well (χ2(40) = 45.684, p = 
0.248, CFI = 0.992, RMSEA = 0.036). 
Next, the SEM model is estimated with perceived RQ measured using 
only the other RQ indicators in Figure 14 and omitting the RMM indicators (see 
Figure 15, Panel B). In this case, the direct link from auditor agreement to 
perceived RQ is expected to be insignificant, and the results confirm the 
                                                            
17 Agreement is coded as 1 = Agree, 2 = Disagree. The indicators of reporting quality are 
captured as the participant’s perceived risk of material misstatement, then recoded by subtracting 
the values from 100 so that higher values of RMM indicate a lower risk. This creates RMM 
indicators with the same sign as the other RQ indicators. 
           91
 92 
 
prediction (standardized path coefficient = -0.113, Z = -1.333, p = 0.183). 
Furthermore, the model does not fit the data as well as the RMM model (χ2(41) = 
57.088, p = 0.049, CFI = 0.972, RMSEA = 0.059). 
Finally, the SEM model is estimated including all RQ and RMM indicators 
shown in Figure 14 (see Figure 15, Panel C). Results indicate that auditor 
agreement negatively affects overall perceived RQ, as predicted (standardized 
path coefficient = -0.260, Z = -2.794, p = 0.005), and this effect occurs through 
the RMM aspect of RQ. A repeated measure ANOVA of participants’ pre and 
post-test assessments of the overall RMM verifies that level of agreement 
significantly changes individual participants’ assessed RMM (F= 10.59, p = 
0.002). Additionally, the model in step three does not fit the data well (χ2(84) = 
198.963, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.898, RMSEA = 0.111), and has fit statistics 
significantly worse than those obtained when RMM and RQ indicators are 
separated. Going forward, perceived RMM and RQ will be treated as two 
separate factors in the SEM analysis. 
Figure 15 – Three SEM Models for Testing H318 
Panel A – Stage 1 
 
                                                            
18 SEM models are depicted without error terms from this point forward. Additionally, the only 
parameters reported in the model diagrams are path coefficients. 
           92
 93 
 
 
Panel B – Stage 2 
 
Panel C – Stage 3 
 
Table 12 – SEM Results of the Three-Step Hypothesis Test 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
Step χ2 df p CFI RMSEA 
1 45.684 40 0.248 0.992 0.036 
2 57.088 41 0.049 0.972 0.059 
3 198.963 84 <0.001 0.898 0.111 
Panel B – Parameter Estimates 
Step Link 
Standardized 
Path Coefficient Z-Stat p 
1 Agree  RQ -0.273 -2.862 0.004 
2 Agree  RQ -0.113 -1.333 0.183 
3 Agree  RQ -0.251 -2.671 0.008 
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Experiment One: Hypothesis Four 
Hypothesis four states that auditor disagreement with management 
reporting choices will increase subadditivity as measured by the unpacking factor 
(UF) defined in Equation 1. Overall, participants demonstrated a high level of 
subadditivity; the mean (median) of UF for all participants is 2.19 (2.00), which is 
significantly different than 1.0 (t(145) = 11.767, p < 0.001). It should be noted that 
merely asking all participants to assess the risk of material misstatement for the 
financials as a whole as well as for the asset and liability described in the audit 
disclosure causes a certain degree of unpacking based solely on the structure of 
the questions (the question frame causes a certain level of unpacking). The 
important consideration is whether there is greater unpacking of the 
misstatement hypothesis in the disagreement conditions. Indeed, consistent with 
the prediction in H4, UF is significantly higher in the disagreement conditions 
(mean = 2.30) than in the agreement conditions (mean = 1.89) (t(110) = -2.149, p = 
0.017, one-tailed), lending support to H4. 
Experiment One: Hypothesis Five 
 Hypothesis five (a) predicts perceived management credibility will 
positively affect perceived RQ. This hypothesis is tested using the model 
depicted in Figure 16. Perceived management credibility positively affects 
perceived RQ (standardized path coefficient = 0.915, Z = 5.812, p < 0.001), and 
the results provide support for H5(a). The model fits the data well (χ2(33) = 41.967, 
p = 0.136, CFI = 0.983, RMSEA = 0.049). 
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Hypothesis five (b) predicts that perceived auditor independence will 
positively affect perceived RQ. H5(b) is partially tested in stage two of the H4 
testing (see Figure 15 Panel B). The SEM results from Figure 15, Panel B 
indicate that perceived independence does positively affect perceived RQ 
(standardized path coefficient = 0.690, Z = 5.482, p < 0.001) (Table 13). 
However, the results of H5(a) indicate that perceived management credibility also 
positively affects perceived RQ, and therefore, both H5(a) and H5(b) need to be 
tested simultaneously with a model that includes both perceptions of 
management credibility and auditor independence (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 16 – SEM Results for H5(a) 
 
 
Figure 17 – SEM Results for H5(a) and H5(b) 
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The SEM results indicate that perceived auditor independence positively 
affects perceived RQ (standardized path coefficient = 0.166, Z = 2.171, p = 
0.015), as does perceived management credibility (standardized path coefficient 
= 0.816, Z = 5.078, p < 0.001). However, the model fit is questionable (χ2(180) = 
383.663, p < 0.001, CFI = 0.862, RMSEA = 0.101). 
Table 13 – SEM Results for H5(a) and H5(b) 
Panel A - Selected Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Error Z-stat 
P (one-
tailed) 
Agreement --> Independ. -0.846 -0.364 0.228 -3.716 0.001
Agreement --> RMM -0.756 -0.38 0.182 -4.145 <0.001
Consistency --> Mgt Cred. -0.252 -0.198 0.134 -1.885 0.030
Independ. --> RQ 0.119 0.166 0.055 2.171 0.015
RMM --> RQ 0.296 0.355 0.066 4.512 <0.001
Mgt Cred. --> RQ 1.063 0.816 0.209 5.048 <0.001
 
Panel B - Standardized Total Effects 
  Consistency Agreement RMM Mgt Credibility Independ.
RMM N/A -0.380 N/A N/A N/A 
Mgt Cred. -0.198 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Independ. N/A -0.364 N/A N/A N/A 
RQ -0.161 -0.195 0.355 0.816 0.166 
 
Experiment One: Hypothesis Six 
Hypothesis six predicts that users will invest more as perceived RQ 
increases. The hypothesis is first tested with the SEM model in Figure 18. Based 
on the results, RQ positively affects investment amounts (standardized path 
coefficient = 0.679, Z = 4.556, p< 0.001), but RMM does not directly affect 
investment (standardized path coefficient = -0.072, Z = -0.549, p = 0.583). 
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Interestingly, RMM only affects investment indirectly through the other aspects of 
RQ (total standardized effect = 0.419). The model fits the data well (χ2(21) = 
30.201, p = 0.088, CFI = 0.989, RMSEA = 0.063). The results provide preliminary 
support for H6. 
Figure 18 – SEM Results for H6 
 
Testing of H6 within the complete model (Figure 19) shows that perceived 
RQ positively affects investment. When investment is added to the complete 
model in Figure 17, the result indicates that perceived RQ positively affects 
investment as expected (standardized path coefficient = 0.653, Z = 6.581, p < 
0.001). However, AMOS estimates a negative variance for the error term (E2) 
associated with the RQ latent variable, resulting in an inappropriate solution. 
Estimating the SEM again with the variance for E2 fixed at zero yields an 
appropriate solution, and the inferences remain unchanged – perceived RQ 
positively affects investment (standardized path coefficient = 0.648, Z = 6.530, p 
< 0.001) (Figure 19). 
Additional statistical tests (t-tests for mean equivalency) confirm that 
auditor agreement and incentive consistency affect investment. In total, auditor 
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Figure 19 – SEM Results for H6 within the Full Model 
 
All indicator and error terms are omitted for clarity. 
agreement increases investment by 30% over the control condition ($31,316 
compared to $24,165 out of a possible $50,000 allocation, t(89) = 3.005, p = 
0.003). Disagreement decreases investment by 21% compared to the control 
condition ($18,970 compared to $24,165, t(87) = -2.022, p = 0.046). Agreement 
increases investment over the disagreement condition by 65%, a $12,346 
increase (t(110) = 5.541, p < 0.001). Similarly, a simple independent samples t-test 
shows that users invest 20% ($5,561) less in the incentive consistent cell than in 
the incentive inconsistent cell (t(110) = 2.258, p = 0.026).  
Experiment Two 
Experiment Two: Research Question One and Hypothesis Seven 
Hypothesis seven predicts that order directly affects participant’s 
materiality levels. However, based on research question one, it is unclear 
whether the effect order will hold in the after-implicit cell. Therefore, I begin the 
analysis by investigating research question one. Two tests investigate RQ1. First, 
it is necessary to establish whether the means of Distance (distance between 
participants’ materiality and the auditor’s materiality) in the after, explicit (AE) and 
after, implicit (AI) cells are statistically different. If not, the analysis can proceed 
to comparing the combined after (Ax) and combined before (Bx) cells. If AE and 
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AI differ on mean Distance, it is still possible that order has a moderated effect in 
the AI condition. If so, then the mean Distance in AI should be significantly 
smaller than in the Bx cells. 
The mean distance of AE ($220,144) is significantly smaller than the mean 
distance of AI ($317,217) based on an independent samples t-test (t(64) = 2.249, 
p = 0.028) (Table 14, Panel A). The mean distance of AI and Bx ($287,447) are 
not statistically different (t(78) = 0.791, p = 0.431) (Table 10, Panel B) Taken 
together, these results suggest that anchoring does not occur in the AI condition. 
Therefore, to test H7, I compare the mean distance of AE to the mean distance 
of the combined AI and Bx cells (Other). The mean distance of AE ($220,114) is 
significantly smaller than the mean distance of Other ($298,611) (t(114) = 2.522, p 
= 0.007) (Table 10, Panel C). 
According to the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality (untabulated), the raw 
participant materiality and Distance variables violate the normal distribution 
assumption of the t-test for all cells and cell combinations. To check the 
robustness of the t-test findings, I construct a dummy variable coded as one 
Table 14 – RQ1 Statistical Results 
Panel A – AE Compared to AI 
Cell N 
Mean 
Distance 
Std. 
Dev. t(64)
p (two-
tailed) 
AE 36 220,144 136,423
 2.249 0.028 AI 30 317,217 211,685
Panel B – AI Compared to Bx 
Cell N 
Mean 
Distance 
Std. 
Dev. t(78) 
p (two-
tailed) 
AI 30 317,217 211,685
 0.791 0.431 
Bx 50 287,447 125,485
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Panel C – AE Compared to All Other Cells  
Cell N Mean Distance 
Std. 
Dev. t(114) 
p (one-
tailed) 
AE 36 220,144 136,423
 2.522 0.007 
Other 80 298,611 162,563
 
when a participant’s materiality response is within +$50,000 of the case 
materiality ($300,000) and zero otherwise. In the AE cell, 22.2% (8/36) of the 
observations fall within $50,000 of the case materiality compared to just 3.8% 
(3/80) of the observations in the other three cells. Both Pearson’s Chi-Square 
(χ2(1) = 9.87, p = 0.002) and Fisher’s Exact Test (p = 0.004) indicate the 
difference is significant. Neither expanding the range to + $100,000 nor 
shortening the range to + $25,000 changes the statistical inferences (Table 15). 
Taken together, I interpret the findings as support for the reduced distance 
predicted in H7, but only when the auditor’s materiality level is explicitly stated. 
Table 15 – Non-Parametric Results 
Cell Within 25K Within 50K Within 100K 
AE 3/36 = 8.3% 8/36 = 22.2% 10/36 = 27.8% 
Other 0/80 = 0.0% 3/80 = 3.8% 5/80 = 6.3% 
Fisher's Exact p = 0.028 p = 0.002 p = 0.001 
Pearson Chi-Square p = 0.009 p = 0.004 p = 0.003 
 
Experiment Two: Hypothesis Eight 
According to H8a, users’ perceptions of audit quality will increase when 
users anchor on the auditor’s materiality disclosure. Additionally, the increase in 
perceived quality should be a function of the distance between the users’ 
materiality and the auditor’s, as explained in the build-up to H8a. However, 
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because Distance is not normally distributed, I construct a new variable in 
Equation 4, LnDistance, with which to test H8a and H8b. 
4) LnDistance = Ln|Participant Materiality – 300,000| 
 Figure 20 depicts the path analysis model used to test H8a; results are 
tabulated in Table 16. The model fits the data well (χ2(1) = 0.111, p = 0.739, CFI = 
1.0, RMSEA = 0.0). The AE cell significantly reduces the distance between 
participants’ materiality levels and that of the auditor (path coefficient = -1.280, Z 
= -3.218, p = 0.001). Furthermore, as LnDistance decreases (increases), 
perceived audit quality increases (decreases), as predicted (path coefficient = -
1.703, Z = -1.999, p = 0.046), providing support for H8a. 
Figure 20 – H8(a) Path Model with Standardized Parameters 
 
 
Table 16 – H8(a) Path Analysis Results 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
0.111 1 0.739 1.000 0.000 
 
Panel B - Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error Z p 
AE  LnDistance -1.280 -0.287 0.398 -3.218 0.001
LnDistance  PAQ -1.703 -0.183 0.852 -1.999 0.046
 
 Figure 21 depicts the path analysis model used to test H8b. The model fits 
the data well (χ2(2) = 0.120, p = 0.942, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = 0.0) (Table 17). The 
statistical inferences for the path from AE through LnDistance to perceived audit 
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quality remain unchanged. Additionally, LnDistance positively affects perceived 
risk of material misstatement (path coefficient = 2.606, Z = 2.057, p = 0.001), and 
perceived audit quality negatively affects the perceived risk of material 
misstatement (path coefficient = -0.244, Z = -1.827, p = 0.034 (one-tailed)). 
These findings support H8b. 
Figure 21 – H8(b) Path Model with Standardized Parameters 
 
 
Table 17 – H8(b) Path Analysis Results 
Panel A – Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
0.12 2 0.942 1.000 0.000 
 
Panel B – Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Error Z-stat 
P(one-
tailed) 
AEorNot  LnDistance -1.282 -0.288 0.397 -3.226 0.001 
LnDistance  PAQ -1.710 -0.184 0.851 -2.009 0.023 
PAQ  RMM -0.244 -0.164 0.134 -1.827 0.034 
LnDistance  RMM 2.606 0.187 1.267 2.057 0.020 
 
Experiment Two: Hypothesis Nine 
To test H9, I continue to expand the path analysis used to test H8b by 
adding paths from perceived audit quality and risk of material misstatement to 
investment (Figure 22). The model continues to fit the data well (χ2(4) = 5.600, p = 
0.231, CFI = 0.932, RMSEA = 0.058) (Table 18). Perceived audit quality 
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positively affects investment, as expected (path coefficient = 152.108, Z = 2.632, 
p = 0.008). However, perceived risk of material misstatement has an unexpected 
positive relation with the amount users choose to invest (path coefficient 89.875, 
Z = 2.324, p = 0.010). The total effect of the AE cell on investment is negative (-
$15.04) due to the unexpected positive relation between RMM and investment. 
Taken together, the statistical analysis does not provide support for H9. 
Figure 22 – H9 Path Model with Standardized Parameters 
 
Table 18 – H9 Path Analysis Results 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
5.600 4 0.231 0.932 0.058 
 
Panel B - Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error Z 
P(one-
tailed) 
AEorNot  LnDistance -1.282 -0.288 0.397 -3.226 0.001 
LnDistance  PAQ -1.710 -0.184 0.851 -2.009 0.023 
PAQ  RMM -0.244 -0.164 0.134 -1.827 0.034 
LnDistance  RMM 2.606 0.187 1.267 2.057 0.020 
RMM  Investment 89.875 0.208 38.681 2.324 0.010 
PAQ  Investment 152.108 0.235 57.787 2.632 0.004 
 
Experiment Two: Hypothesis Ten 
H10a predicts that after participants are informed of the known 
misstatements in the financial statements, perceptions of audit quality will 
decrease. The mean audit quality rating is 66.1 prior to exposure to the 
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misstatements and 57.5 after. Repeated measures ANOVA shows that the 
change is significant (F(1,118) = 17.4, p < 0.001), providing support for H10a. 
However, the mean of perceived audit quality does not significantly differ 
between the AE and Other cells (AE = 57.2, Other = 57.6), suggesting that H10b 
cannot be rejected. Further investigation using path analysis confirms that the 
explicit materiality disclosure has no effect on perceived audit quality after 
exposure to the misstatement. 
Path analysis does allow for further insights into the process that 
determines post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality. First, the judged 
severity of the misstatement and users’ preliminary perception of audit quality are 
both expected to influence post-misstatement perceived audit quality. As 
previously mentioned, the judged severity of the misstatement is expected to 
depend on both the magnitude and sign of the distance between users’ 
materiality and the misstatement. Also, the statistical analysis supporting H8a 
indicates that the AE cell affects users’ preliminary perception of audit quality, 
which provides a second path through which it may affect post-misstatement 
perceived audit quality. The full path diagram is depicted in Figure 23. 
Figure 23 – H10(b) Path Model with Standardized Parameters 
 
Path analysis shows the model in Figure 23 fits the data well (χ2(6) = 6.879, 
p = 0.332, CFI = 0.984, RMSEA = 0.035) (Table 19). The AE condition has no 
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effect on DistanceToMis (path coefficient = -8,582, Z = -0.154, p = 0.877), and 
thus has no effect on the perceived severity of the misstatement and post-
misstatement perceived audit quality through the path predicted in the 
development of H10b. DistanceToMis negatively impacts the perceived severity 
of the misstatement (standardized path coefficient = -0.316, Z = -3.590, p < 
0.001). The perceived severity of the misstatement reduces post-misstatement 
perceived audit quality (path coefficient = -0.277, Z = -4.136, p < 0.001) as 
expected. Finally, users’ original perceptions of audit quality positively affect their 
post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality (path coefficient = 0.703, Z = 
7.772, p < 0.001), also as expected. 
Table 19 – H10(b) Path Analysis Results 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
6.879 6 0.332 0.984 0.035 
 
Panel B - Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Error Z P 
AEorNot  Distance -8,581.77 -0.014 55,577 -0.154   0.877 
Distance  Severity 0.00 -0.316 0.000 -3.590 <0.001 
Severity  PAQ 2 -0.24 -0.295 0.067 -4.136 <0.001 
PAQ 1  PAQ 2 152.11  0.554 0.090  7.772 <0.001 
While the AE condition does not increase post-misstatement perceived 
audit quality through the path predicted in the development of H10b, it does 
significantly increase post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality through its 
effect on users’ preliminary perceptions of audit quality. Figure 24 depicts a 
simple extension of the path model in Figure 20. This path model fits the data 
well (χ2(3) = 0.382, p = 0.944, CFI = 1.0, RMSEA = 0.0) (Table 20). Perceived 
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audit quality positively affects post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality 
(path coefficient = 0.636, Z = 6.589, p < 0.001). The total effect of the AE cell on 
post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality is positive (1.386), lending 
practical support to H10b. 
 
Figure 24 – Alternative Path from AE to Post-Misstatement AQ 
 
Table 20 – Alternative Path from AE to Post-Misstatement AQ Path Analysis 
Results 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
0.382 3 0.944 1.000 0.000 
 
Panel B - Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient
Stand. 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error Z P 
AEorNot  LnDistance -1.280 -0.287 0.398 -3.218  0.001
LnDistance  PAQ 1 -1.703 -0.183 0.852 -1.999  0.046
PAQ 1  PAQ 2   0.636  0.517 0.097  6.589 <0.001
 
Experiment Two: Research Question Two 
 RQ2 questions what effect (if any) a materiality disclosure will have on 
users’ liability judgment against the auditor. To examine the effects of the 
materiality disclosure, the path models from Figures 22 and 23 are combined into 
the new path model depicted in Figure 25. 
The path model fits the data adequately, though the RMSEA is beyond 
some common thresholds (χ2(14) = 21.215, p = 0.096, CFI = 0.929, RMSEA = 
0.066) (Table 21) (Byrne 2010). AE does not significantly affect users’ liability 
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assessments because, interestingly, post-misstatement audit quality does not 
significantly affect liability. The only direct effect on liability is due to the 
perceived severity of the misstatement (path coefficient = 0.475, Z = 5.467, p < 
0.001). From an auditor’s perspective, it is somewhat troubling that 
Figure 25 – RQ2 Path Analysis Results 
 
post-misstatement perceived audit quality has no effect on users’ liability 
judgments, though it does reflect the acknowledged expectations gap, and gives 
empirical credence to the notion that liability judgments against auditors may 
stem, in part, from the expectations gap. However, it should be noted that the 
materiality disclosure did not make the liability judgments worse in this setting. 
Table 21 – RQ2 Path Analysis Results 
Panel A - Fit Statistics 
χ2 df p CFI RMSEA
21.215 14 0.096 0.929 0.066 
 
Panel B - Path Coefficients 
Link 
Path 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error Z P 
AEorNot  LnDist. -1.280 -0.287 0.398 -3.218 0.001
DistToMis  Severity 0.000 -0.316 0.000 -3.589 <0.001
LnDist.  PAQ 1 -1.703 -0.183 0.852 -1.999 0.046
Severity  PAQ 2 -0.277 -0.295 0.067 -4.136 <0.001
PAQ 1  PAQ 2 0.703 0.554 0.090 7.772 <0.001
Severity  Liability 0.475 0.465 0.087 5.467 <0.001
PAQ 2  Liability 0.007 0.007 0.093 0.077 0.939
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Table 22 provides a summary of the hypothesis testing results. 
Table 22 – Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypotheses and Research Questions Result 
H1 Users’ perception of auditor independence will decrease 
when the auditor disagrees with management. Supported 
H2 Users’ perception of management credibility will increase 
as the incentive-consistency of management’s reporting 
choices decreases. 
Supported 
H3 Users’ perceived risk of material misstatement will 
increase (decrease) when the auditor disagrees (agrees) 
with management’s reporting choices. 
Supported 
H4 Auditor disagreement (agreement) creates subadditivity 
associated with the misstatement (no misstatement) 
hypothesis such that UFagree > UFcontrol > UFdisagree. 
Supported 
H5a Users’ perceived reporting quality will decrease as 
perceived management credibility decreases. Supported 
H5b Users’ perceived reporting quality will decrease as 
perceived auditor independence decreases. Supported 
H6 Users will invest less as their perceptions of reporting 
quality decrease. Supported 
RQ1 Will users’ materiality judgments be affected by the audit 
disclosure when materiality is implied as opposed to 
explicitly stated in the disclosure? 
No 
H7 Users’ materiality judgments will be closer to the 
auditor’s when elicited after reviewing the audit 
disclosure than before. 
Supported* 
H8a Users’ perceptions of audit quality will increase when 
users’ materiality is closer to the auditor’s materiality. Supported 
H8b Users’ perceived risk of material misstatement will 
decrease when users’ materiality is closer to the auditor’s 
materiality. 
Supported 
H9 Users’ willingness to invest will increase when users’ 
materiality is closer to the auditor’s materiality. 
Not 
Supported 
H10a Users’ perceptions of audit quality will decrease after 
exposure to known misstatements. Supported 
H10b The distance between users’ and auditors’ materiality will 
have no effect on users’ perceptions of audit quality after 
exposure to known misstatements. 
Supported**
RQ2 Will the auditor’s materiality disclosure affect users’ 
liability judgments for known misstatements below 
materiality? 
No 
* H7 is supported in the explicit disclosure condition. 
** The distance between users' and auditors' materiality thresholds has a 
negative relation with post-misstatement perceptions of audit quality, but not 
through the path theoretically predicted in the build-up to H10b. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
Experiment One 
The purpose of this dissertation as a whole is to investigate the effects of 
increased audit disclosure on users’ perceptions of financial reporting quality, 
management, and the auditor as well as users’ investment-related judgments 
and decisions. The purpose of experiment one is to determine how audit 
disclosures related to management estimates affect users’ perceptions after 
controlling for differences in the financial strength of companies and the presence 
of an unqualified opinion. 
 
Discussion: Experiment One, Auditor Agreement 
 Auditor agreement appears to be the single most important variable in the 
audit disclosure in terms of determining investor perceptions and investment. 
Hypothesis one states that users will perceive auditors as less (more) 
independent when they disagree (agree) with management given they are 
provided an unqualified opinion. H1 is supported by the statistical tests. 
Generally, standard setters and investors are concerned with auditor 
independence because they worry that the auditor will lose skepticism and fail to 
disagree with management when necessary. This would suggest that concerns 
about independence would be heightened when the auditor consistently agrees 
with management. Interestingly, the results indicate just the opposite, agreement 
increases perceptions of independence over both the control and disagreement 
conditions, whereas the disagreement condition does not statistically differ from 
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the control condition. This implies that there is no downside to expanding 
disclosures for auditors when it comes to user perceptions of independence. On 
one hand, expressing agreement with management in light of a clean opinion 
increases perceived independence, on the other, expressing disagreement does 
not change perceptions of independence compared to no expression. 
The result from hypothesis one is likely counter-intuitive to those familiar 
with the ongoing debate about auditor independence. Typically, independence 
problems are perceived to arise when the auditor inappropriately agrees with 
management, and this finding indicates that because an overwhelming majority 
of opinions are clean opinions, the auditor only benefits by expressing specific 
agreement with management estimates. Further work may be necessary to 
determine whether additional audit disclosures would increase the number of 
actual independence lapses due to the additional incentive to agree with 
management estimates. Such a finding would certainly be counter to regulators’ 
intentions for expanded auditor reporting. 
In addition to its positive effect on perceptions of independence, auditor 
agreement also positively affects users’ judged risk of material misstatement 
(RMM), and both perceived independence and RMM affect perceptions of 
reporting quality (RQ). These changes in judgments and perceptions are 
important because they make a real impact on users’ willingness to invest. 
Furthermore, auditor agreement has a direct, positive effect on users’ 
investments apart from its indirect effects through perceptions of independence, 
RMM, and RQ. In total, auditor agreement increases investment by 30% over the 
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control condition ($31,316 compared to $24,165 out of a possible $50,000 
allocation). Disagreement decreases investment by 21% compared to the control 
condition ($18,970 compared to $24,165). Agreement increases investment over 
the disagreement condition by 65%, a $12,346 increase. 
Discussion: Experiment One, Incentive Consistency 
 Investors have called for auditor reporting regarding management’s 
estimates in part so that investors can see through management bias. Investors 
want the auditors to report where management’s estimates fall within a range so 
that they can evaluate whether management is being conservative or aggressive 
(PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2011). Hypothesis two, which states that users will 
perceive management as less (more) credible when management reports are 
consistent (inconsistent) with management’s incentives, is generally supported 
by the statistical tests. Perceptions of management credibility in the experimental 
conditions do differ from one another and in the predicted direction. The 
Jonckheere-Terpstra test shows that the conditions are ordered as expected; 
incentive inconsistent (consistent) reporting produces the highest (lowest) 
credibility ratings, with the control condition in between. This result is further 
supported by a planned contrast and an ANOVA directly comparing the incentive 
consistent and inconsistent cells. The results show that providing additional 
information on management estimates to users does change their opinion of 
management’s reporting credibility. Users appear to see through management’s 
self-serving reporting choices, and there is both an upside and downside for 
management in that reporting consistently (inconsistently) with incentives 
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decreases (increases) perceived credibility from the baseline of the control 
condition.  
 Furthermore, changes in perceived management credibility positively 
affect perceptions of RQ, and ultimately, the investment decision. The changes in 
users’ perceptions of management credibility positively affect their perceptions of 
reporting quality (H5a). Multicollinearity problems between credibility and 
reporting quality make the relation between user perceptions of management 
credibility and willingness to invest unclear using SEM. A model that combines 
reporting quality and management credibility into one factor results in an 
insignificant path coefficient between incentive consistency and the combined 
credibility/reporting quality factor. However, a simple independent samples t-test 
shows a significant investment difference of $5,561 (20%) between the incentive 
consistent and inconsistent cells. Users invest 20% less in the incentive 
consistent conditions compared to the incentive inconsistent conditions. The fact 
that audit disclosures related to management’s reporting choices are value-
relevant indicates that standard setters’ proposals to include these disclosures 
may achieve their goals of increased transparency and value-relevance. These 
audit disclosures make management biases more transparent to financial 
statement users in a meaningful way. 
 
Discussion: Experiment One Control Variables 
Examining the financial statement and audit report control variables 
(relevance, comparability, and understandability) in experiment one also yields 
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insights. Users find the expanded audit disclosures more useful in the investment 
decision-making process despite also considering them more difficult to use 
(harder to compare across companies and more difficult to understand) than a 
control condition that does not include specific information about management 
estimates or the auditor’s opinion about those estimates. 
The apparent trade-off between investment decision usefulness and 
comparability and understandability is interesting to consider. The usefulness 
rating in this experiment is specifically tied to the investment decision (see the 
wording in Appendix A, page 139). The FASB framework states that the primary 
purpose of external financial reporting is to aid in investment decisions (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board 2010a), thus if users feel the auditor's report has 
increased investment decision usefulness, it appears to be a positive change. 
The reason that comparability across companies is important is due to the fact 
that investors must allocate limited assets to specific investments. If expanded 
audit disclosures increase the investment decision usefulness of the auditor’s 
report for each individual investment option, any comparisons between 
investments would be based on better information. This seems likely to 
compensate for the loss of uniformity in the audit report across companies. 
Moreover, more sophisticated users may not encounter the same reductions in 
comparability and understandability as non-professional investors (California 
Public Employees' Retirement System 2011). Thus, any costs may only accrue to 
a portion of the user population, while increased usefulness benefits all users. 
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However, because there is no normative answer to the investment 
allocation in this experiment, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether 
the overall trade-off between usefulness and comparability and understandability 
results in better investment allocations. My conclusion is that expanded 
disclosures make the auditor’s report more value-relevant and useful, but 
regulators should consider ways to minimize losses in the areas of comparability 
and understandability. Future research could examine alternative approaches to 
expanding disclosures in an effort maximize benefits and minimize costs. 
Other measured control variables in experiment one include demographic 
variables (see Table 1, Panel A) and variables capturing experience using 
financial statements, experience using audit reports, and investment activity (see 
Table 1, Panel B).  Controlling for these variables does not change the preceding 
statistical inferences or interpretations. 
 
Limitations of Experiment One 
 Experiment one has at least four limitations. First, the experiment can only 
speak to the effects of expanded audit disclosure in the presence of an 
unqualified opinion. The application of support theory in the build-up to H1 might 
imply different findings in a setting with a qualified or adverse audit opinion. 
Constraints on the number and available time of participants limited the 
experiment to one setting. However, I feel comfortable with the choice of setting, 
as the vast majority of audit opinions are unqualified, particularly for publicly 
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traded companies, and that seems unlikely to change even if audit reports are 
expanded. 
 Second, I made the choice to use a between and within participants 
design. The within participants portion of the design allows for more observations 
(and thus more power) from the same number of participants. It also allowed the 
participants a point of comparison for reviewing the audit disclosures, which is 
important when comparing entities based on metrics that are unfamiliar or difficult 
to evaluate (Hsee 1996). In this case, I expected my participants to be unfamiliar 
with the expanded audit disclosures because they do not exist in practice. 
Despite the benefits in this case, within participant designs have been criticized 
for the potential to cause demand effects (Greenwald 1976) though others 
suggest this may not occur as often as previously thought (Birnbaum 1999) or 
may even be of benefit when the researcher is interested in participants’ ability to 
discriminate between treatments, as is the case in this experiment (Greenwald 
1976). In this case, I believe the benefits of the within participants portion of the 
design outweigh the detriments. 
 Third, the experiment does not compare the proposed audit disclosure 
with the current audit report, but rather a control that leaves out the agreement 
and incentive consistency portions of the disclosure. This prevents a direct 
comparison to current practice. However, I believe that such a direct comparison 
would not be useful in this experiment because of the sheer number of variables 
that would differ between current practice and the proposed audit disclosure. It 
would be difficult, if not impossible to evaluate the causes of differences in the 
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dependent variables of interest with such a comparison. Furthermore, any 
regulatory changes would affect all audit reports falling into a particular category 
of companies, such as all publicly traded companies in the United States, so 
testing for the effects of the changes within the proposed report may be more 
meaningful in practice than testing for differences between current and proposed 
reports. 
 Finally, experiment one uses a sample size that is smaller than generally 
recommended for use in structural equation modeling.  However, results from 
path analysis provide identical inferences and similar path coefficients. 
 
Conclusions: Experiment One 
 Users are asking regulators to expand the auditor’s report. Experiment 
one examines one of the requested expansions – auditor commentary on 
management estimates. Financial statement users are capable of using the 
disclosure, despite the increased effort required, and this is reflected both in self-
reports of the usefulness of the disclosure and in the differences in users’ 
perceptions and investment behavior. There appears to be little if any downside 
to the expanded disclosure for auditors (at least in terms of public perception) as 
perceptions of independence in the worst experimental case (disagreement while 
giving a clean opinion) were no different than in the control condition. While work 
remains to be done in examining the real cost-benefit trade-off of expanded audit 
disclosures, it appears that expanding disclosures surrounding management 
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estimates would achieve regulators’ goals of increasing the value-relevance and 
transparency of the auditor’s report. 
The results described above make a theoretical contribution related to the 
construct of RQ. Based on the result showing that auditor agreement has an 
overall effect on perceived RQ – but only through the RMM element of RQ – it 
appears that participants act as if the risk of material misstatement and the other 
combined elements of RQ are separate, distinct sub-constructs within overall 
perceived RQ. This may be important in future research that seeks to measure or 
investigate perceived RQ. 
The results also contribute to the current policy debate. Auditing standards 
setters have expressly set out to improve the auditor’s report by increasing its 
transparency and value-relevance for users (PCAOB 2011b; IAASB 2012). The 
experiment provides evidence that the standard setters’ proposals – increasing 
audit disclosure surrounding management estimates – could achieve these 
goals. While the evidence suggests that users’ evaluations of management and 
the auditor are in fact influenced by increased audit disclosure, it remains a 
matter of further study as to whether the costs (reduced comparability and ease 
of use) outweigh the benefits. However, what is clear is that expanded audit 
disclosures are value-relevant to users’ investment decisions. Furthermore, the 
effects are in the logically expected directions; when auditors express 
disagreement with management’s reporting choices and when management 
reports in a way that appears self-serving, users invest less. 
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Finally, the experiment also provides much needed information to help 
auditors assess the possible impact of current regulatory proposals on users’ 
perception of auditors and their clients. This study provides auditors with 
evidence that such disclosures can improve users’ perceptions of an auditor’s 
independence, which demonstrates that there are benefits in expanded 
disclosure for auditors as well as users. 
Experiment Two 
Discussion: Experiment Two, Materiality Disclosure 
 The purpose of experiment two is to determine how materiality disclosures 
affect investors’ materiality judgments and perceptions of audit quality. 
Experiment two is intended to be more exploratory in nature than experiment 
one. In experiment two, the first prediction (that users’ materiality will be closer to 
that of auditors when elicited after users’ read the auditor’s disclosure) is based 
on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic. However, anchoring and adjustment 
is a phenomenon that is typically demonstrated under conditions that are more 
simplistic than the conditions of experiment two. For example Tversky and 
Kahneman demonstrated anchoring by having participants spin a rigged roulette 
wheel and then asking them the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Such an experiment is a very direct 
assessment of anchoring and adjustment because there are no other numbers 
involved other than the anchor and the participant’s judgment, and the participant 
likely has no notion of the correct answer. In experiment two, participants in all 
conditions are exposed to a wide variety of numbers prior to making a materiality 
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judgment. Specifically, participants view financial statements and an industry 
description that include numbers ranging from 10 to 10 billion. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether participants have an idea of the personal materiality limits that 
they bring to the experiment. Both of these facts work against finding any effect 
of anchoring on participants’ materiality judgments. 
 Despite the factors working against finding any anchoring effect, an 
explicit disclosure of the auditor’s materiality threshold significantly changes the 
number of participants who judge their own materiality as close to the auditor’s. 
While not every participant in the after explicit (AE) cell behaves as if they have 
anchored on the audit disclosure, a significant number do, enough to statistically 
reduce the mean distance between the materiality of the AE group and the 
auditor when compared to the other three cells. 
 From both a regulatory and accounting theory standpoint, the fact that the 
audit disclosure moves a non-trivial portion of the participants towards the 
auditor’s materiality level is a problem. As previously discussed, materiality is 
legally defined as an amount that matters to the investment-related judgments or 
decisions of a reasonable investor. A user’s materiality is an individual decision, 
historically made independent of the auditor. When the auditor provides a 
materiality level that affects users’ judgments, the practical definition of 
materiality changes from something that matters to users, to something that 
matters to auditors. This is particularly problematic because the independent 
decisions of users and auditors do not match well. When users provided a 
materiality level prior to exposure to the auditor’s level, they gave materiality 
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levels that were generally much lower than audit materiality. This indicates that a 
conventional audit materiality level is not sufficient for non-professional investors. 
 If the change in users’ materiality levels had no further effects, it could be 
considered trivial. However, based on the results of this experiment, the distance 
between a user’s materiality and the auditor’s affects important judgments. As 
the distance decreases, users’ perceptions of audit quality increase and 
perceptions of RMM decrease. Given constant audit quality and financial 
performance, both of these judgment changes are indicative of users who are 
willing to take on more risk than they would without the materiality disclosure. 
 
Discussion: Experiment Two, Misstatement Effects 
 Exposure to misstatements that were known by the auditor 
understandably reduces users’ perceptions of audit quality. However, 
perceptions of audit quality after the misstatement are higher in the AE cell (by 
1.4 points on a seven-point scale) than in the other cells. I interpret this as 
evidence that the materiality disclosure provides the auditor with some 
reputational protection in the event of a known misstatement below the disclosed 
materiality threshold. However, the explicit disclosure of an audit materiality 
threshold has no effect on participants’ willingness to hold the auditor liable for 
the misstatements. Rather, the liability decision is driven by the perceived 
severity of the misstatement, which itself is determined by the distance from 
users’ materiality to the misstatement. 
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Discussion: Experiment Two, Control Variables  
 Measured control variables in experiment two include demographic 
variables and variables capturing experience using financial statements, 
experience using audit reports, and investment activity (see Table 3). Controlling 
for these variables does not change the preceding statistical inferences or 
interpretations of the hypothesis tests. However, analyses of the control variables 
uncovered several significant statistical relations that could be explored in future 
materiality studies. For example, the amount of participants’ annual investment 
and gender are significant in predicting participants’ materiality judgments. Age is 
significant in predicting perceived audit quality after a misstatement. The 
frequency with which participants review the financial statements and auditor’s 
report prior to investing are significant in predicting the perceived severity of a 
misstatement. Finally, gender is significant in predicting users’ willingness to hold 
the auditor liable for known misstatements.  
 
Limitations of Experiment Two 
 I believe experiment two suffers from a lack of power in detecting 
investment and liability effects due to the fact that only a portion of the 
participants in one cell appear to be affected by the auditor’s materiality 
disclosure. Based on the findings, In future experiments, this limitation can be 
reduced in future experiments by manipulating materiality elicitation at two levels 
rather than four, with one cell in which materiality is elicited before exposure to 
an audit materiality disclosure and one cell in which materiality is elicited after 
exposure to an explicit materiality disclosure. 
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 It also remains unclear why perceived RMM positively affects users’ 
investment levels. In experiment one, RMM negatively affected investment, albeit 
indirectly. One hypothesis is that the difference may be due to the difference in 
participants between the studies. The MBA students in experiment one would be 
expected to better understand the relation between RMM and investment risk. 
Also, it is possible that the non-professional investors in experiment two are 
simply risk-seeking in an effort to reap greater potential returns. 
 
Conclusions: Experiment Two 
 While the explicit disclosure of auditor materiality changed a number of 
user perceptions, important investment and legal liability decisions were not 
effected in this experiment. Based solely on these results, it appears that 
regulatory proposals requiring auditors to disclose materiality would have little 
practical effect. However, as noted above, experiment two is subject to 
limitations. Also, it has yet to be shown what effect a public materiality disclosure 
would have on the performance of auditors and management. If a public 
materiality disclosure affects auditors or managers, it is possible that users would 
be affected as a result. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Directions for Future Research: Experiment One 
Future research could address many of the limitations noted in the 
preceding discussion. For regulatory reasons, it is important to begin studying the 
cost-benefit tradeoffs of expanded disclosures, particularly the trade-offs 
           122
 123 
 
between comparability and decision relevance and understandability and 
decision relevance. For the same reasons, it is also important to directly compare 
regulators’ proposed disclosures with the current audit report on the metrics of 
comparability, understandability, and decision relevance. While expanding audit 
disclosures appear to meet regulators’ goals, it is important to understand 
whether they do so in a cost-efficient way. 
 A limitation of experiment one is that it only examines a setting with an 
unqualified audit opinion. While unqualified opinions comprise the vast majority of 
public company opinions, qualified opinions, when they occur, are also important. 
It could be fruitful to examine the effects of auditor agreement across audit 
opinions; the independence effects would likely reverse in the presence of a 
qualified or adverse opinion because auditor disagreement with management 
would no longer conflict with the audit opinion. 
 
Directions for Future Research: Experiment Two 
In experiment two, some users in the after-explicit condition appear to 
anchor on the auditor’s disclosure (roughly 1/4 to 1/3) while others do not. It would 
be interesting, and potentially important to standard setters, auditors, and users, 
to explain how users set materiality and why some are influenced by a disclosure 
while others are not. Additionally, it is important to understand how disclosing 
audit materiality will affect auditors and managers. For instance, will auditors 
attempt to use their ability to influence user materiality limits to their advantage 
(potentially increasing materiality limits) or will public disclosures cause auditors 
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to feel more accountable to users (potentially decreasing materiality limits)? 
Further study of expanded audit disclosures may be fruitful for many years to 
come, but will be particularly useful in the immediate future as regulators, 
auditors, users, and preparers continue to debate the merits of expanded audit 
disclosure.  
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Glossary 
Accounting Acronyms  
     AD&A......................... Auditor Discussion and Analysis 
     APB............................ Auditing Practices Board (UK and Ireland), regulator 
and standard setter 
     CPA........................... Certified Public Accountant 
     EC.............................. European Commission (European Union), regulator 
     EPS............................ Earnings per share - calculated by dividing a 
company's net income less dividends paid to 
preferred shareholders by the weighted average 
number of shares of common stock outstanding 
during the year. 
     FRC........................... Financial Reporting Council (UK and Ireland), 
regulator and standard setter 
     IAASB........................ International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (International), regulator and standard setter 
     PCAOB...................... Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(U.S.A.), regulator, standard setter, enforcement 
  
Accounting Terminology  
     Book/Waive Decision. A decision the auditor makes regarding the 
disposition of a material misstatement detected 
during the audit. The auditor may require the client 
to adjust the financial statements for the 
misstatement (book the misstatement) in order to 
receive an unqualified opinion, or the auditor may 
choose to issue an unqualified opinion despite the 
misstatement (waive the misstatement) 
     Misstatement............. A violation of correct accounting that may be due to 
error or intent. 
  
Audit Opinions  
     Adverse Opinion........ An audit opinion in which the auditor states that the 
financial statements are NOT fairly presented in all 
material respects in accordance with an applicable 
accounting framework. 
     Clean Opinion............ Also an unqualified opinion. An audit opinion in 
which the auditor states that the financial 
statements are fairly presented in all material 
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respects in accordance with an applicable 
accounting framework. 
     Qualified Opinion....... An audit opinion in which the auditor states that the 
financial statements are fairly presented in all 
material respects with one or more exceptions. 
     Unqualified Opinion... Also called a "clean opinion." An audit opinion in 
which the auditor states that the financial 
statements are fairly presented in all material 
respects in accordance with an applicable 
accounting framework. 
  
Cell Acronyms  
     AE.............................. After, explicit cell in experiment two 
     AI............................... After, implicit cell in experiment two 
     BE.............................. Before, explicit cell in experiment two 
     BI............................... Before, implicit cell in experiment two 
     Bx............................... Combined before explicit and implicit cells in 
experiment two 
     Other.......................... Combined after implicit, before explicit, and before 
implicit cells in experiment two 
Other Acronyms  
     RMSEA...................... Root Mean Square Error of Approximation - 
According to Byrne 2010, a cutoff point of 0.06 is 
generally considered to represent good fit. 0.10 to 
0.06 represents adequate fit. 
     RMM.......................... Risk of Material Misstatement 
     RQ............................. Reporting Quality 
  
Other Terminology  
     AMOS........................ Structural equation modeling software 
     Toluna........................ An online survey company that specializes in 
distributing surveys and providing incentives for 
valid responses 
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Appendix B – Instrument: Experiment One
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Appendix C – Instrument: Experiment Two
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Appendix D – Correlation Table: Experiment One
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Correlation Table (continued)
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o Average overall instructor rating: 3.4/4.0 
 
Publications – Professional Journals: 
Doxey, M., 2008, “Financial Statements: An Opportunity to Tell Your Story,” 
Greater Lansing Business Monthly November: 46. 
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HONORS & AWARDS 
 2012 American Accounting Association Doctoral Consortium – Lake 
Tahoe 
 Awarded one of 30 Accounting Doctoral Scholar slots available nationally 
for 2009 
 University of Kentucky Daniel R. Reedy Quality Award – 2009, 2010, 2011 
 Accounting & Computer Information Systems Scholar Award – Northern 
Michigan University -2005 
 Graduated Summa Cum Laude from Northern Michigan University - 2005 
 Beta Gamma Sigma National Honor Society 
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